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96 N.C. L. REV. 1725 (2018)

DEFINING NORTH CAROLINA’S PUBLIC
RECORDS AND OPEN MEETINGS FEESHIFTING PROVISIONS IN THE LARGER
NATIONAL CONTEXT *
ELLIOT ENGSTROM **
North Carolina’s Public Records and Open Meetings laws both
provide for awards of attorney’s fees in certain situations. The
Public Records law awards fees to a plaintiff who “substantially
prevails” and a government defendant who is sued in bad faith
or on a frivolous basis. The Open Meetings law awards fees to
any party that “prevails.” These fee awards act as an incentive
(or disincentive) for litigants to pursue these “open government”
cases. Such awards are the exception to the general North
Carolina rule that a party bears the burden of paying its own
attorney’s fees.
There is very limited appellate case law interpreting when a party
should receive such an award of attorney’s fees. This limited case
law is exacerbated by the recent modification of the plaintiffs’
fee-shifting provision in the Public Records law.
While appellate treatment of this issue is limited, there is a larger
body of trial court decisions and persuasive case law on point.
There are also materially similar fee-shifting provisions
elsewhere in the North Carolina General Statutes that can
provide guidance on how North Carolina courts treat fee
shifting. This Article examines these and other sources in pursuit
of a better understanding of when a plaintiff or defendant in an
open government case might expect to receive an award of
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attorney’s fees and, when appropriate, makes recommendations
about how courts and practitioners should treat these provisions
moving forward.
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INTRODUCTION
The North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure authorize an
“award of costs” to a party where a court finds such an award to be
“equitable and just.” 1 However, this award of costs does not include
attorney’s fees. 2 The rule in North Carolina is that a party may only
recover attorney’s fees “when authorized by statute.” 3 The only
exception that spans across most subject matter is the court’s
discretionary power to “award a reasonable attorney’s fee to the
prevailing party” in a case where the losing party fails to raise “a
justiciable issue of either law or fact . . . in any pleading.” 4 Other
statutory awards of attorney’s fees tend to be narrow in scope. 5 Two
of these narrower exceptions are found in North Carolina’s open
government laws.
North Carolina has two open government laws. The first is the
Public Records Act, which provides for access to state and municipal
government records. 6 The second is the Open Meetings law, which,
with limited exceptions, requires that public bodies meet in the open
and provides a cause of action to challenge violations. 7 Nearly every
1. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-263 (2017).
2. Swaps, LLC v. ASL Props., Inc., __ N.C. App. __, __, 791 S.E.2d 711, 712 (2016)
(“Here, the General Assembly chose only to refer to ‘costs’ in Section 1-263 and not to
specify that the term costs includes attorneys’ fees. Thus, we hold that N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1263 does not permit the trial court to award attorneys’ fees.”).
3. Hoke Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. State, 198 N.C. App. 274, 281, 679 S.E.2d 512, 518
(2009).
4. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 6-21.5 (2017).
5. See, e.g., id. § 6-21.1(a) (allowing attorney’s fees as part of costs in certain cases
involving personal injury or property damage); id. § 6-19.1(a) (allowing a party defending
against or appealing an agency decision to recover its attorney’s fees where it prevails
against the State); cf. Arnold v. Ariz. Dep’t of Health Servs., 775 P.2d 521, 537 (Ariz.
1989) (“The private attorney general doctrine is an equitable rule which permits courts in
their discretion to award attorney’s fees to a party who has vindicated a right that: (1)
benefits a large number of people; (2) requires private enforcement; and (3) is of societal
importance.”).
6. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 132-1 to -11 (2017).
7. Id. §§ 143-318.9 to -318.18.
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state provides for some form of fee shifting in its Public Records and
Open Meetings laws. 8 Such fee awards serve as an incentive for
members of the public to keep governments open and accountable. 9
These awards can amount to thousands or even tens of thousands of
dollars. 10 They are distinct from attorney’s fees awarded as part of a
sanction against a party bringing suit for an improper purpose. 11
The goal of this research is to give definition to when a plaintiff
or defendant might receive attorney’s fees under North Carolina’s
Public Records or Open Meetings laws. While this research does
provide persuasive examples from federal courts and other states,
these examples are not intended to serve as an exhaustive survey of
fee shifting across jurisdictions. Rather, these examples have been
selected from jurisdictions that have materially similar provisions to
those of North Carolina.
While this Article does not achieve absolute clarity as to the
meaning of these provisions, it does provide useful guidance for
litigants and judges who must deal with awards of attorney’s fees
under these open government provisions. As to North Carolina’s
Public Records Act, it seems likely that the State’s courts will
eventually have to decide how to interpret the plaintiff’s fee-shifting
provision in light of competing persuasive frameworks. Different
jurisdictions have interpreted similar language in very different ways,
giving North Carolina courts various examples to follow. Further,
North Carolina Public Records defendants should rarely, if ever,
expect to receive a fee award except when faced with the most
egregious conduct by plaintiffs.

8. See infra Parts I.B.2, II.E.
9. See, e.g., Cmty. Youth Athletic Ctr. v. City of Nat’l City, 164 Cal. Rptr. 3d 644, 694
(Cal. Ct. App. 2013) (“Indeed, the very purpose of the attorney fees provision is to
provide ‘protections and incentives for members of the public to seek judicial enforcement
of their right to inspect public records subject to disclosure.’” (quoting Galbiso v. Orosi
Pub. Util. Dist., 84 Cal. Rptr. 3d 788, 807 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008))); see also Frankel v. D.C.
Office for Planning & Econ. Dev., 110 A.3d 553, 558 (D.C. 2015) (noting that the threat of
having to pay a plaintiff’s attorney’s fees can incentivize agencies to respond to public
records requests).
10. See, e.g., Free Spirit Aviation, Inc. v. Rutherford Airport Auth., No. 06-CVS-106,
2009 WL 8660508, at *4 (N.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 6, 2009) (awarding a plaintiff $17,500 in an
Open Meetings lawsuit), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 206 N.C. App. 192, 696 S.E.2d 559
(2010); Lothrop v. Chatham Cty. Bd. of Elections, No. 06-CVS-239, 2006 WL 4526077, at
*6 (N.C. Super. Ct. Sept. 12, 2006) (awarding a plaintiff $3,500 in attorney’s fees for a
partial Open Meetings victory); see also Wolf v. Grubbs, 759 N.W.2d 499, 529 (Neb. Ct.
App. 2009) (awarding appellees $17,457.46 in an action for Open Meetings Act violations).
11. See, e.g., Davis v. Durham Cty. Area Mental Health, No. 02-CVS-02211, 2002 WL
34202184, at *5 (N.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 15, 2002).
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Regarding the Open Meetings law, it could at first be
discouraging to see that the number of times North Carolina’s
appellate courts have interpreted the fee-shifting provision can be
counted on one hand. However, these courts have made clear that
they put a great amount of weight on persuasive authority from
jurisdictions like the Fourth Circuit that already have a great wealth
of case law on hand. 12 Courts and practitioners interpreting this
provision, therefore, have substantially more material to work with
than initially meets the eye.
I. FEE AWARDS UNDER THE NORTH CAROLINA PUBLIC RECORDS
ACT
The North Carolina Public Records Act (“NCPRA”) is codified
at section 132 of the General Statutes of North Carolina. 13 It is North
Carolina’s state-level corollary to the federal Freedom of Information
Act (“FOIA”). 14 The statutory scheme provides for a broad policy
allowing “the people [to] obtain copies of their public records and
public information free or at minimal cost unless otherwise
specifically provided by law.” 15 Therefore, “any person” may examine
and copy public records upon request. 16 A given record could
potentially be partially public and partially confidential, and in such
situations a government agency may not use this as a justification for
denying access to public records. 17 Any person who is denied access to
public records may file suit in the General Court of Justice “for an
order compelling disclosure or copying.” 18 It is in such actions that the
questions surrounding fee awards are raised.

12. See, e.g., Free Spirit Aviation, Inc. v. Rutherford Airport Auth., 206 N.C. App.
192, 203, 696 S.E.2d 559, 567 (2010) (quoting Grissom v. Mills Corp., 549 F.3d 313, 318
(4th Cir. 2008)); H.B.S. Contractors, Inc. v. Cumberland Cty. Bd. of Educ., 122 N.C. App.
49, 57, 468 S.E.2d 517, 522 (1996) (citing Smith v. Univ. of N.C., 632 F.2d 340, 350, 352 (4th
Cir. 1980)).
13. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 132-1 to -11 (2017).
14. See Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012).
15. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 132-1 (2017).
16. Id. § 132-6(a).
17. See id. § 132-6(c) (“No request to inspect, examine, or obtain copies of public
records shall be denied on the grounds that confidential information is commingled with
the requested nonconfidential information. If it is necessary to separate confidential from
nonconfidential information in order to permit the inspection, examination, or copying of
the public records, the public agency shall bear the cost of such separation.”).
18. Id. § 132-9(a).
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A. The NCPRA provides for fee awards to plaintiffs who
“substantially prevail,” but the meaning of this language is less
than clear.
A North Carolina plaintiff who “successfully compels”
production of public records shall “recover its reasonable attorneys’
fees if attributed to those public records” if the plaintiff “substantially
prevails.” 19 The award is mandatory rather than discretionary. 20
However, a court may not assess attorney’s fees against a
governmental entity where, in denying access to records, the agency
relied on a judgment or order “applicable to the governmental unit or
governmental body.” 21 Further, fees may not be assessed where the
governmental entity relied on “[t]he published opinion of an
appellate court, an order of the North Carolina Business Court, . . . a
final order of the Trial Division of the General Court of Justice,” or
“[a] written opinion, decision, or letter of the Attorney General.” 22
Prior to the addition of this more specific “substantially prevails”
language in 2010, a governmental defendant could avoid a fee award
if it “acted with substantial justification in denying access” to
records. 23 If the presiding court finds that the entity “acted in
reasonable reliance,” the court is prohibited from assessing attorney’s
fees against the entity. 24 North Carolina shares this concept with
Massachusetts and Texas. 25
19. Id. § 132-9(c).
20. See id.; cf. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 10005 (2017) (“The court may award
attorney fees and costs to a successful plaintiff of any action brought under this section,
but only if the court finds that the action was frivolous or was brought solely for the
purpose of harassment.” (emphasis added)).
21. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 132-9(c)(1) (2017).
22. Id. § 132-9(c)(2)–(3).
23. Act of June 10, 2010, ch. 169, sec. 21(c), § 132-9(c), 2010 N.C. Sess. Laws 638, 660
(codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 132-9(c) (2017)).
24. See id.; see, e.g., Brief of Defendant-Appellee at 5, Tillet v. Town of Kill Devil
Hills, __ N.C. App. __, 809 S.E.2d 145 (2017) (No. COA 17-433) (“Defendant cited
numerous Court of Appeals opinions . . . standing for the proposition that documents
involving personnel matters and criminal investigative materials are not a matter of public
record.”).
25. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 66, § 10A(d)(2) (West, Westlaw through ch. 63 of
2018 Second Ann. Sess.) (“There shall be a presumption in favor of an award of fees and
costs unless the agency or municipality establishes that . . . the agency or municipality
reasonably relied upon a published opinion of an appellate court of the commonwealth
based on substantially similar facts.”); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 552.323(a) (West,
Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess.) (“[T]he court shall assess costs of litigation and
reasonable attorney fees incurred by a plaintiff who substantially prevails, except that the
court may not assess those costs and fees against a governmental body if the court finds
that the governmental body acted in reasonable reliance on . . . the published opinion of
an appellate court . . . .”).

96 N.C. L. REV. 1725 (2018)

2018]

FEE-SHIFTING PROVISIONS

1731

Prior to the 2010 amendment, the statute merely awarded
attorney’s fees to a “prevailing” plaintiff. 26 The summary of ratified
legislation for 2010 simply notes that the fee award is mandatory, but
does not mention the change in language from “prevailing party” to
“substantially prevails.” 27 It is probable that the legislature would not
have changed the words of the statute if it did not intend to change its
meaning. 28 However, it is not immediately clear what it means for a
plaintiff to “substantially prevail” versus merely “prevail,” as both
terms are used in different areas of the General Statutes. 29 The
potential for ambiguity is increased by the possibility that a given
record might be partially confidential and partially public. 30
While there is no legislative history indicating what the General
Assembly intended when it changed the wording from “prevailing
party” to “substantially prevails,” it certainly cannot be a coincidence
that the 2010 amendment makes the North Carolina fee provision
nearly identical to its Texas counterpart. 31 The Texas “substantially
26. Act of June 10, 2010, sec. 21(c), § 132-9(c), 2010 N.C. Sess. Laws at 660.
27. RESEARCH DIV. OF THE N.C. GEN. ASSEMBLY, SUMMARIES OF SUBSTANTIVE
RATIFIED LEGISLATION 26 (2010) (noting that where a party “successfully compels the
disclosure of public records, the court must allow that party to recover its reasonable
attorneys’ fees”).
28. See State v. Davis, 198 N.C. App. 443, 452, 680 S.E.2d 239, 246 (2009) (“[I]n
construing a statute that has been repealed or amended, it may be presumed that the
legislature intended either to change the substance of the original act or to clarify the
meaning of the statute.” (quoting State v. Bright, 135 N.C. App. 381, 383, 520 S.E.2d 138,
139 (1999))). But see Ray v. N.C. Dep’t of Transp., 366 N.C. 1, 21 n.3, 727 S.E.2d 675, 688
n.3 (2012) (“Whereas it is logical to conclude that an amendment to an unambiguous
statute indicates the intent to change the law, no such inference arises when the legislature
amends an ambiguous provision.” (quoting Childers v. Parker’s, Inc., 274 N.C. 256, 260,
162 S.E.2d 481, 484 (1968))).
29. Cf. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 6-21.5 (2017) (awarding attorney’s fees to a “prevailing
party” in nonjusticiable cases); see also id. § 44A-35 (allowing attorney’s fees for a
“prevailing party” in certain cases involving statutory liens); id. § 113-391.1(e)(3)
(providing that a party who “substantially prevails” in compelling disclosure of
information that was alleged to have been a trade secret by another party “shall . . .
recover its reasonable attorneys’ fees if attributed to that information”).
30. Section 132-6(c) prohibits a public entity from denying access to public
information on the grounds that it is commingled with confidential information. However,
this does not resolve whether a plaintiff who compels production of only a portion of a
record may be considered to have “substantially” prevailed. Id. § 132-6(c).
31. Compare Act of July 10, 2010, ch. 169, sec. 21(c), § 132-9, 2010 N.C. Sess. Laws
638, 660 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 132-9(c) (2017)) (directing a court to allow a party
who substantially prevails in an action to compel disclosure of public information to
recover of its reasonable attorney’s fees), with TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 552.323(a)
(West, Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess.) (“In an action brought under Section 552.321 or
552.3215, the court shall assess costs of litigation and reasonable attorney fees incurred by
a plaintiff who substantially prevails, except that the court may not assess those costs and
fees against a governmental body if the court finds that the governmental body acted in
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prevails” standard was initially enacted in 1993 as part of a larger
legislative package that the Texas legislature deemed
“nonsubstantive.” 32 In 1999, a decade before the North Carolina
amendment, the provision went through its largest change, which
mirrors today’s North Carolina statute. 33 While this might be a reason
for North Carolina courts to look to Texas case law for guidance, they
are by no means bound to do so. 34
The fee award to a substantially prevailing plaintiff is mandatory,
as is the prohibition on such an award where the governmental
defendant reasonably relied on one of the listed authorities in
denying access to public records. 35 This mandatory fee award leaves
no room for judicial discretion, meaning that whether a plaintiff has
substantially prevailed is purely a question of law. 36 However, the
definition of when a plaintiff has substantially prevailed is up for
judicial interpretation. The words of a statute must first and foremost
be given their ordinary meaning. 37 However, where a statute is
ambiguous, a court may construe the statute to “ascertain the
legislative will.” 38 The phrase “substantially prevail” is ambiguous
because it is “fairly susceptible of two or more meanings.” 39 The
mandatory nature of the fee award and ambiguity of the standard
leave a prominent role for case law in determining when plaintiffs
substantially prevail in North Carolina Public Records suits.
While North Carolina appellate case law provides some insight
into defining when a plaintiff has substantially prevailed, there are
limits to its usefulness. The most obvious limitation is timing—the
reasonable reliance on: (1) a judgment or an order of a court applicable to the
governmental body; (2) the published opinion of an appellate court; or (3) a written
decision of the attorney general, including a decision issued under Subchapter G or an
opinion issued under Section 402.042.”).
32. Act of May 22, 1993, ch. 268, sec. 1, § 552.323, 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws 583, 606
(codified at TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 552.323 (West, Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess.)).
33. See Act of June 18, 1999, ch. 1319, sec. 28, § 552.323, 1999 Tex. Gen. Laws 4500,
4512 (codified at TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 552.323 (West, Westlaw through 2017 Reg.
Sess.)); see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 132-9(c) (2017).
34. See infra Parts I.B.2, I.C.
35. § 132-9(c).
36. Cathey v. Cathey, 210 N.C. App. 230, 231–32, 707 S.E.2d 638, 640 (2011)
(“Questions of statutory interpretation are ultimately questions of law for the courts and
are reviewed de novo.” (quoting In re Summons Issued to Ernst & Young, LLP, 363 N.C.
612, 616, 684 S.E.2d 151, 154 (2009))).
37. Abernethy v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Pitt Cty., 169 N.C. 631, 635, 86 S.E. 577, 579
(1915).
38. Purcell v. Friday Staffing, 235 N.C. App. 342, 347, 761 S.E.2d 694, 698 (2014)
(quoting State v. Beck, 359 N.C. 611, 614, 614 S.E.2d 274, 277 (2005)).
39. Abernethy, 169 N.C. at 636, 86 S.E.2d at 580.
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legislature only recently amended the NCPRA to its current
“substantially prevails” framework. 40 This leads to problems for
current practitioners, as any cases decided under the previous
framework were interpreting different statutory language.
Even prior to 2010, the only relevant North Carolina appellate
law directly interpreting the plaintiff’s fee provision of the NCPRA
was North Carolina Press Association v. Spangler. 41 There, the
defendant, the President of the University of North Carolina, claimed
that despite the trial court’s order to release records, their release was
actually the result of an internal decision. 42 The defendant went on to
argue that “petitioners cannot be a prevailing party” because “the
documents were released as a consequence of a decision made prior
to the lawsuit, not as a consequence of the lawsuit.” 43 In an attempt to
harmonize federal case law as it stood at the time with that of North
Carolina, the defendant claimed that “the moving party has the
burden of showing that the lawsuit caused the agency to release the
documents.” 44
The Court of Appeals rejected the defendant’s attempt to
harmonize state and federal law, reasoning that FOIA contained
“language substantially different from [the North Carolina] Public
Records Act.” 45 The court found that, due to this difference, the
federal case law was “not persuasive.” 46 Therefore, the Spangler court
drew a stark line between the fee provisions of the NCPRA and its
federal counterpart as they existed in 1989. Were the text of the
statutes today the same as in the past, this stark line would likely still

40. See Act of July 10, 2010, ch. 169, sec. 21(c), § 132-9, 2010 N.C. Sess. Laws 638, 660
(codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 132-9(c) (2017)).
41. 94 N.C. App. 694, 381 S.E.2d 187 (1989).
42. Id. at 697, 381 S.E.2d at 190 (“Here petitioners obtained an Order from the trial
court directing respondents to release the records for inspection, examination and
copying. That respondents were able to obtain a stay of the trial court’s order pending
appeal does not alter the fact that petitioners were the prevailing party in their action.”).
43. Id. at 697, 381 S.E.2d at 189–90.
44. Brief of Appellant at 10, N.C. Press Ass’n. v. Spangler, 94 N.C. App. 694, 381
S.E.2d 187 (1989) (No. 8810 SC 1004) [hereinafter Spangler Brief] (citing Vt. Low Income
Advocacy Council v. Usery, 546 F.2d 509, 510 (2d Cir. 1976) (interpreting the attorney’s
fees provision of the Freedom of Information Act), abrogated by Union of Needletrades,
Indus. & Textile Emps., AFL-CIO, CLC v. U.S. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 336
F.3d 200 (2d Cir. 2003)).
45. Spangler, 94 N.C. App. at 697, 381 S.E.2d at 190.
46. Id.; cf. Capitol Info. Ass’n v. Ann Arbor Police, 360 N.W.2d 262, 264 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1984) (“Federal cases dealing with the analogous federal statute are highly
persuasive in construing Michigan’s Freedom of Information Act.”).
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be in effect as stare decisis. 47 However, both provisions contained
different text at that point in time than they do today.
In 1989, FOIA provided courts with the discretionary power to
award a plaintiff its “reasonable attorney fees and other litigation
costs” where it had “substantially prevailed.” 48 The statute provided
no further guidance on what these words meant. 49 At the same time,
the NCPRA’s fee provision was split between two statutes. The
relevant provision of the NCPRA provided a cause of action for
access to public records. 50 Another statute then gave courts the power
to award “reasonable attorney’s fees” in “any civil action in which a
party successfully [compelled] the disclosure of public records
pursuant to” that cause of action. 51 However, such awards were only
allowed where the governmental defendant “acted without
substantial justification in denying access to the public records” and
where there were “no special circumstances that would make the
award of fees unjust.” 52
The defendant in Spangler argued that in order to be a prevailing
party under the NCPRA, the plaintiff’s lawsuit “not only must have
induced the disclosure of the records, but must have been necessary to
induce such disclosure.” 53 There was some question as to whether this
was a correct statement of the rule to which the defendant cited. 54
47. See, e.g., Musi v. Town of Shallotte, 200 N.C. App. 379, 383, 684 S.E.2d 892, 896
(2009) (“The judicial policy of stare decisis is followed by the courts of this state. Under
this doctrine, ‘[t]he determination of a point of law by a court will generally be followed by
a court of the same or lower rank[.]’” (quoting Dunn v. Pate, 106 N.C. App. 56, 60, 415
S.E.2d 102, 104 (1992), rev’d on other grounds, Dunn v. Pate, 334 N.C. 115, 431 S.E.2d 178
(1993))).
48. Act of Nov. 21, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-502, sec. 1, § 552(a)(4)(E), 88 Stat. 1561, 1562
(1974) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E)(i) (2012)).
49. Cf. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E)(i) (2012) (providing that a plaintiff substantially
prevails where it obtains relief through either “a judicial order, or an enforceable written
agreement or consent decree,” or “a voluntary or unilateral change in position by the
agency, if the complainant’s claim is not insubstantial”).
50. Act of June 24, 1975, ch. 787, § 3, 1975 N.C. Sess. Laws 1112, 1113 (codified as
amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 132-9 (2017)).
51. Act of July 22, 1983, ch. 918, § 1, 1983 N.C. Sess. Laws 1266, 1266, repealed by Act
of July 10, 1995, ch. 388, sec. 6, § 6-19.2, 1995 N.C. Sess. Laws 949, 954.
52. Id. at 1267.
53. Spangler Brief, supra note 44, at 10 (emphasis added) (citing Vt. Low Income
Advocacy Council, Inc. v. Usery, 546 F.2d 509, 510 (2d Cir. 1976), abrogated by Union of
Needletrades, Indus. & Textile Emps., AFL-CIO, CLC v. U.S. Immigration &
Naturalization Serv., 336 F.3d 200 (2d Cir. 2003)).
54. The defendant in Spangler cited the federal rule as stating that a plaintiff’s lawsuit
“must have been necessary to induce” the disclosure of records. Id. However, the case to
which the defendant cited states that “[i]n order to obtain an award of attorney fees in an
FOIA action, a plaintiff must show at minimum that the prosecution of the action could
reasonably have been regarded as necessary and that the action had substantial causative
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Regardless, the Court of Appeals found that the “successfully
compelled” language of the NCPRA as it existed in 1989 presented a
more plaintiff-friendly standard than the “substantially prevails”
language of FOIA as it existed at that same time. 55
Despite the fact that the court declined to follow FOIA, Spangler
still contains several propositions which could likely be useful in
North Carolina Public Records litigation. 56 The Court of Appeals
simply declined to consider federal case law as persuasive where the
federal language was “substantially different” from the controlling
state statute. 57 Implicit in this statement, though, is the idea that
where statutes contain language similar to that found in the NCPRA,
the statutes and their interpreting case law could be persuasive. 58 This
implicit statement may now be of some use given that the current
FOIA fee provision is similar to North Carolina’s current fee
provision. 59
The federal FOIA provides for a discretionary award of fees
where a plaintiff “has substantially prevailed,” 60 but that provision
then goes on to provide further definition. 61 The provision is

effect on the delivery of the information. Vt. Low Income Advocacy Council v. Usery, 546
F.2d 509, 513 (2d Cir. 1976) (emphasis added), abrogated by Union of Needletrades,
Indus. & Textile Emps., AFL-CIO, CLC v. U.S. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 336
F.3d 200 (2d Cir. 2003).
55. N.C. Press Ass’n v. Spangler, 94 N.C. App. 694, 696–97, 381 S.E.2d 187, 189–90
(“Respondents cite several federal cases for the proposition that petitioners have the
burden of showing that their lawsuit caused the agency to release the documents . . . . The
cases that respondents cite interpret the Federal Freedom of Information Act which
contains language substantially different from our Public Records Act. The cases are not
persuasive here.”).
56. See, e.g., id. at 698–99, 381 S.E.2d at 191 (“[T]he Public Records Act does not give
a governmental agency the discretionary authority to decline to comply with an order for
release of records to the public until a time when the agency has determined that release
would be prudent or timely.”); id. at 697, 381 S.E.2d at 190 (“That respondents were able
to obtain a stay of the trial court’s order pending appeal does not alter the fact that
petitioners were the prevailing party in their action.”).
57. Id. at 697, 381 S.E.2d at 190.
58. See, e.g., H.B.S Contractors, Inc. v. Cumberland Cty. Bd. of Educ., 122 N.C. App.
49, 57, 468 S.E.2d 517, 522 (1996) (interpreting North Carolina statutory language allowing
a “prevailing party” its reasonable attorneys’ fees in light of the Fourth Circuit’s
interpretation of a similar federal provision granting reasonable attorney’s fees to a
prevailing party (citing Smith v. Univ. of N.C., 632 F.2d 340, 350, 352 (4th Cir. 1980))).
59. Compare 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E)(i) (2012) (allowing a court to assess reasonable
attorneys fees in favor of a party who “has substantially prevailed”), with N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 132-9(c) (2017) (allowing a party who “substantially prevails” in an action to compel
disclosure of public information to recover its reasonable attorneys’ fees).
60. § 552(a)(4)(E)(i).
61. It provides as follows:
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therefore similar, though not identical, to its North Carolina
counterpart. Thus, the Spangler court’s rejection of federal case law
as a persuasive source is likely no longer binding on North Carolina
courts, for the simple reason that, under the modern, more similarly
worded state and federal statutes, the court’s reasoning no longer
holds. Case law interpreting the federal provision is likely now
persuasive in North Carolina. 62
While less informative, an example of when a plaintiff
substantially prevails in a Public Records action can be garnered from
Wilson v. North Carolina Department of Commerce. 63 There, the
plaintiff alleged that the North Carolina Department of Commerce
was illegally withholding access to public notices. 64 The case was
initially filed on February 18, 2014. 65 The trial court quickly granted
the plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction compelling
disclosure of unemployment hearing notices as public records. 66 The
defendant appealed, but before the court of appeals could hear the
case, the General Assembly amended the relevant statute to make
confidential the information sought by the plaintiff. 67
The court of appeals held that the legislative amendment did not
moot the appeal because it did not “provide plaintiffs the relief they
sought: compelled disclosure of the hearing notices prior to the
August 2014 amendment and attorneys’ fees for enforcing that
right.” 68 Therefore, even after the August 2014 amendment, the
plaintiffs still could have, in theory, substantially prevailed for the
purposes of receiving an award of attorney’s fees. However, there
would still be one more hurdle for the plaintiffs, who would have to
show that the August 2014 amendment was “substantive” rather than
For purposes of this subparagraph, a complainant has substantially prevailed if the
complainant has obtained relief through either–
(I) a judicial order, or an enforceable written agreement or consent decree; or
(II) a voluntary or unilateral change in position by the agency, if the complainant’s
claim is not insubstantial.
Id. § 552(a)(4)(E)(ii).
62. See infra Part I.B.1.
63. 239 N.C. App. 456, 768 S.E.2d 360 (2015).
64. Complaint at 2, Wilson v. N.C. Dep’t of Commerce, No. 14-CVS-2499 (N.C.
Super. Ct. Mar. 13, 2014).
65. Id. at 1.
66. Wilson v. N.C. Dep’t of Commerce, No. 14-CVS-2499 (N.C. Super. Ct. Mar. 13,
2014) (granting preliminary injunction).
67. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 96-4(x) (2017) (“Confidential information is exempt from the
public records disclosure requirements of Chapter 132 of the General Statutes.”).
68. Wilson, 239 N.C. App. at 461, 768 S.E.2d at 364.
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“clarifying.” 69 The substantive versus clarifying framework would
essentially decide whether the General Assembly’s amendment
retroactively applied to records requested by the plaintiff. In other
words, the General Assembly has the power to clarify the public or
confidential nature of a given record, and in this way throw an
insurmountable wrench into a plaintiff’s action and request for fees
under the NCPRA. 70
One other North Carolina statute to which courts may look for
guidance is the North Carolina Oil and Gas Conservation Act. 71 That
Act provides that a party who “substantially prevails” in compelling
disclosure of information that was alleged to have been a trade secret
by another party “shall . . . recover its reasonable attorneys’ fees.” 72
The General Assembly only added the language in June 2014, and it
has yet to receive any appellate treatment. 73 However, future
appellate treatment of when a plaintiff substantially prevails in that
context could be persuasive for the Public Records provision.
The myriad of interpretive tools could be cast aside if the North
Carolina appellate courts were given the opportunity to construe the
fee provisions of the Public Records law. However, until that time
comes, practitioners and courts will have to look to persuasive sources
for guidance.
B.

While there is a large body of persuasive case law determining
whether a Public Records plaintiff has “substantially prevailed,”
the treatment of this language is not uniform across jurisdictions.
1. There is a large body of federal case law demonstrating when
parties “substantially prevail” under a “catalyst” framework.

Where North Carolina appellate courts have not established
sufficient precedent on an issue, they will turn to “federal decisions
and opinions drafted by other jurisdictions.” 74 Decisions by federal
courts construing constitutional or statutory language do not control

69. Id. (citing Ray v. N.C. Dep’t of Transp., 366 N.C. 1, 9, 727 S.E.2d 675, 682 (2012)
(noting that clarifying amendments apply to cases brought after the statute’s effective
dates and to cases pending before the courts when the amendment is adopted, while
substantive amendments apply when from the time of the effective date)).
70. Id. at 464, 768 S.E.2d at 366.
71. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113-391.1 (2017).
72. Id. § 113-391.1(e)(3).
73. Act of May 29, 2014, ch. 4, § 8(a), 2014 N.C. Sess. Laws 57, 66 (codified at N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 113-391.1 (2017)).
74. Brown v. Centex Homes, 171 N.C. App. 742, 744, 615 S.E.2d 86, 88 (2005).
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the interpretations of similar language by North Carolina courts, but
they are persuasive. 75
The FOIA fee-shifting provision explains that a court “may”
award attorney’s fees to a plaintiff who “has substantially
prevailed.” 76 The statute goes on to define that a plaintiff “has
substantially prevailed” where it “has obtained relief” through either
“a judicial order, or an enforceable written agreement or consent
decree” or “a voluntary or unilateral change in position by the
agency, if the complainant’s claim is not insubstantial.” 77 This
amendment, which was passed as part of the Open Government Act
of 2007, embodies a “catalyst theory,” under which a plaintiff who
“obtains relief via a voluntary or unilateral change in position by” a
governmental defendant has “substantially prevailed.” 78 This is
similar, though not identical, to the language of the North Carolina
provision, which provides for a mandatory award of fees to a plaintiff
who “substantially prevails,” but provides no further definition. 79
In order to make accurate comparisons between the NCPRA
and FOIA, it is critical to first understand the difference between
eligibility and entitlement in the federal FOIA scheme. Federal courts
first look to whether a plaintiff has substantially prevailed, and is
therefore eligible for attorney’s fees, and only then do they proceed
to decide whether an eligible plaintiff is entitled to a fee award.80 This

75. McNeill v. Harnett Cty., 327 N.C. 552, 563, 398 S.E.2d 475, 481 (1990) (“Decisions
by the federal courts . . . although persuasive, do not control an interpretation by this
Court of the law of the land clause in our state Constitution.”).
76. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E)(i) (2012).
77. Id. § 552(a)(4)(E)(ii).
78. Wildlands CPR v. U.S. Forest Serv., 558 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1098 (D. Mont. 2008)
(citing § 552(a)(4)(E)(ii)) (“The Act thus . . . revived the catalyst theory, i.e., where a
complainant obtains relief via a voluntary or unilateral change in position by the agency,
the complainant has substantially prevailed and is eligible for attorney fees.”); see also
Frankel v. D.C. Office for Planning & Econ. Dev., 110 A.3d 553, 558 (D.C. 2015) (noting
that “Congress acted to ‘clarif[y] that the Supreme Court’s decision in Buckhannon . . .
does not apply to [federal] FOIA cases’” (quoting 153 CONG. REC. S15,831 (daily ed. Dec.
18, 2007) (statement of Sen. Leahy))).
79. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 132-9(c) (2017).
80. See, e.g., Church of Scientology of Cal. v. U.S. Postal Serv., 700 F.2d 486, 489 (9th
Cir. 1983) (“A determination of eligibility does not automatically entitle the plaintiff to
attorney’s fees. Entitlement to attorney’s fees is left to the discretion of the district
court.”) (citations omitted)), abrogated on other grounds by First Amendment Coal. v.
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 869 F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 2017); Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in
Wash. v. FEC, 66 F. Supp. 3d 134, 140 (D.D.C. 2014) (“In this Circuit, the attorney-fee
inquiry is divided into two prongs, the fee ‘eligibility’ and the fee ‘entitlement’ prongs.”
(citing Brayton v. Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, 641 F.3d 521, 524 (D.C. Cir.
2011))); Matlack, Inc. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 868 F. Supp. 627, 630 (D. Del. 1994)
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entitlement analysis does not occur in North Carolina because once a
court determines that a plaintiff has substantially prevailed, the award
of fees is mandatory. 81 Therefore, federal case law is only useful as
persuasive authority in North Carolina to the extent that it provides a
framework for determining whether a plaintiff has substantially
prevailed. 82
In the federal framework, the most straightforward cases are
those in which a court orders a FOIA defendant to produce records. 83
In the past, the United States Supreme Court has held that a plaintiff
could not be considered a prevailing party without obtaining some
sort of judicial relief. 84 However, “Congress amended the statute to
encompass” a “catalyst theory,” which allows a plaintiff to recover its

(providing a straightforward framework of the two-prong eligibility and entitlement
analysis under the federal Freedom of Information Act).
81. § 132-9(c) (providing that a party that “successfully compels the disclosure of
public records . . . shall” be allowed to recover its reasonable attorneys’ fees (emphasis
added)).
82. The eligibility analysis may be useful in providing a model of how to treat pro se
litigants. The United States Supreme Court has generally found that individual pro se
plaintiffs are not eligible for fee awards even if they are themselves practicing attorneys.
Kay v. Ehrler, 499 U.S. 432, 438 (1991) (“A rule that authorizes awards of counsel fees to
pro se litigants—even if limited to those who are members of the bar—would create a
disincentive to employ counsel whenever such a plaintiff considered himself competent to
litigate on his own behalf.”); see Baker & Hostetler LLP v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 473
F.3d 312, 324 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (“We conclude that Baker Hostetler is eligible for
attorney’s fees because of (i) the plain text of the statute and (ii) the Supreme Court’s
decision in Kay v. Ehrler . . . particularly footnote 7 of that opinion. We note, moreover,
that the two other Court of Appeals panels to consider the issue after Kay each
unanimously concluded that a law firm representing itself is eligible for attorney’s fees.”);
see also OFFICE OF THE ATT’Y GEN. OF TEX., PUBLIC INFORMATION HANDBOOK 63
(2016). However, law firms representing themselves have been allowed to recover their
reasonable attorney’s fees in some circuits. Cf. Fraser Trebilcock Davis & Dunlap PC v.
Boyce Trust 2350, 870 N.W.2d 494, 497 (Mich. 2015) (holding that legal services
performed for a law firm by its member lawyers “cannot . . . give rise to an ‘attorney fee’”).
This threshold determination does not go to whether the plaintiff substantially prevailed in
its suit, but rather determines whether a substantially prevailing plaintiff is eligible for an
award of attorney’s fees. Baker & Hostetler, 473 F.3d at 326 (noting that a law firm is
eligible for an award of attorney’s fees and remanding to the trial court to determine
whether the law firm “substantially prevailed” and is entitled to fees).
83. See, e.g., Campaign for Responsible Transplantation v. FDA, 511 F.3d 187, 195
(D.C. Cir. 2007) (“[I]t is clear that a court order requiring a recalcitrant agency to release
documents pursuant to the legal mandate of FOIA is sufficient to render the plaintiff a
prevailing party.”).
84. Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res.,
532 U.S. 598, 606 (2001), superseded by statute, Act of Dec. 31, 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-175,
sec. 4, § 552(a)(4)(E), 121 Stat. 2525, 2525 (2007) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(a)(4)(E) (2012)).
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fees where it is “the catalyst for change,” even if it does not obtain a
favorable judgment. 85
While some cases do involve judicial relief on the merits, many
situations are not so straightforward, such as those involving joint
stipulations, scheduling orders, settlement agreements, or disclosure
by defendants prior to judicial action. But federal courts have
provided guidance on when a plaintiff in such situations substantially
prevails under a catalyst framework. For example, where, after filing
suit, a plaintiff and defendant jointly stipulated to production of the
disputed records at a future date, a federal court of appeals found that
judicial approval of the joint stipulation made the plaintiff a
substantially prevailing party. 86 The court reasoned that, much like a
“settlement agreement enforced through a consent decree,” the joint
stipulation and order “changed the legal relationship between [the
plaintiff] and the defendant.” 87 Similarly, a plaintiff can substantially
prevail through a scheduling order requiring release of records, even
where the order is proposed by the governmental defendant. 88 A
settlement agreement between the parties can also result in a finding
that a plaintiff substantially prevailed where the settlement would not
have been achieved in the absence of litigation. 89
Joint stipulations and settlements are not the only situations in
which a federal plaintiff can substantially prevail despite obtaining no
court-ordered disclosure of records. When no court ordered a
government agency to produce records, a plaintiff nonetheless
substantially prevailed where a court of appeals held that the plaintiff
could proceed with its complaint in district court. 90 A plaintiff has also
85. United States ex rel. Long v. GSDMIdea City, L.L.C., 807 F.3d 125, 128 n.2 (5th
Cir. 2015).
86. Davy v. CIA, 456 F.3d 162, 165 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
87. Id. at 165–66 (alteration in original) (quoting Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 604); see
also Judicial Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 774 F. Supp. 2d 225, 228 (D.D.C. 2011)
(“The Court concludes that Judicial Watch substantially prevailed by virtue of the Court’s
August 2006 acceptance of the parties’ joint stipulation.”).
88. See Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 820 F.
Supp. 2d 39, 44 (D.D.C. 2011) (“Although Judge Leon adopted the schedule proposed by
DOJ, the Order nonetheless required Defendant to complete processing of and produce
all non-referred, non-exempt documents by a specified date.”); see also Elec. Privacy Info.
Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 218 F. Supp. 3d 27, 40 (D.D.C. 2016) (“[T]he
Scheduling Order changed the legal relationship between the parties and EPIC
substantially-prevailed in this litigation as a result of its issuance.”).
89. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 410
F. Supp. 63, 64 (D.D.C. 1975).
90. Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. v. FEC, 66 F. Supp. 3d 134, 142
(D.D.C. 2014) (“[A] plaintiff in this Circuit may establish that he or she has substantially
prevailed by obtaining a ruling that will force an agency to more fully comply with FOIA,
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been found to substantially prevail simply by prompting “a speedier
release of responsive records . . . as amply confirmed by the timing of
the releases shortly after the initiation of [the] lawsuit.” 91 One court
has even held that two plaintiffs substantially prevailed when the
records sought in their FOIA lawsuit were produced at the conclusion
of an entirely separate lawsuit. 92 Finally, where a government agency
produced a large amount of information voluntarily but withheld a
small amount of important documents, the plaintiff substantially
prevailed when a court ordered the defendant to produce those
documents. 93
Federal courts have also provided guidance on situations in
which a plaintiff has not substantially prevailed. Where a FOIA
plaintiff could not show a causal connection between its lawsuit and
the production of records, it did not substantially prevail. 94 Even
under the catalyst framework, the mere fact that a government
agency produces records after the filing of a FOIA suit is insufficient
to show that a plaintiff substantially prevailed where the agency
promptly began procedures to respond to the request and it was
reasonable for the agency to take several months to respond. 95 Put
otherwise, while causing expedited production of records with a
lawsuit may be enough for a plaintiff to substantially prevail, merely
causing an agency to process a request is insufficient. 96 In this way, the
even if such a ruling does not require the actual release of the requested documents in that
matter.”).
91. Dorsen v. SEC, 15 F. Supp. 3d 112, 120 (D.D.C. 2014).
92. Sabalos v. Regan, 520 F. Supp. 1069, 1071 (E.D. Va. 1981) (“The [defendant]
released [the sought-after records] at the conclusion of [other] litigation, and not as a
result of any order promulgated by this court. A plaintiff, however, still may ‘substantially
prevail’ on an FOIA issue, even though the government did not release the requested
information pursuant to court order.”).
93. Cazalas v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 660 F.2d 612, 622–23 (5th Cir. 1981) (“If we
accept the government’s contention on its face, then the government could in any situation
withhold the few ‘smoking gun’ documents, but release all other documents and argue that
the complainant did not substantially prevail if it had to give up that ‘smoking gun’ as a
result of the FOIA suit.”).
94. See Duffin v. Carlson, 636 F.2d 709, 714 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
95. Am. Bird Conservancy v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 110 F. Supp. 3d 655, 664
(E.D. Va. 2015) (“Courts that have considered this issue have uniformly held that the
‘mere filing of the complaint and the subsequent release of the documents is insufficient to
establish causation.’” (quoting Weisberg v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 745 F.2d 1476, 1496
(D.C. Cir. 1984))).
96. Mobley v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 908 F. Supp. 2d 42, 47 (D.D.C. 2012) (“The
plaintiffs here argue that they are eligible for attorney’s fees because, prior to this action
being filed, the defendant refused to process the plaintiffs’ FOIA/PA request, and the
plaintiffs’ first preliminary injunction motion caused the defendant to process the request
. . . . The Court, however, cannot agree with the plaintiffs’ novel interpretation of the term
‘substantially prevailed.’ . . . [T]he D.C. Circuit has interpreted the term ‘substantially
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catalyst test has been used to withhold “substantially prevailing”
status from a plaintiff where other factors contributed to a
defendant’s delay in producing records. 97
2. States with public records regimes similar to North Carolina’s
provide further examples of when a plaintiff might substantially
prevail.
A number of other states award fees to plaintiffs who
substantially prevail in freedom of information lawsuits. These states
provide examples of different lenses through which a court could view
a “substantially prevails” fee-shifting provision. For example, the
Arizona Court of Appeals has read this language to be synonymous
with “the successful party.” 98 Where an Arizona plaintiff and
defendant both prevail in part, the plaintiff has not substantially
prevailed. 99
An Arkansas Public Records statute provides for a mandatory
award of attorney’s fees to “a plaintiff who has substantially
prevailed.” 100 The Arkansas statute does not mention partial awards
of attorney’s fees. 101 Nonetheless, a trial court awarded a plaintiff “a
fraction of” her attorney’s fees because she prevailed on “only
sections of her complaint.” 102 The Supreme Court of Arkansas
reversed. 103 The state’s high court noted that the plaintiff did not
substantially prevail, “as required by the state statute.” 104 Under these
interpretations, the words “substantially prevail” leave no room for a
party to partially prevail and receive a partial award of attorney’s
fees.

prevailed’ rather narrowly to require that a FOIA plaintiff relying on the catalyst theory
must receive records responsive to its request in order for that plaintiff to have
‘substantially prevailed.’” (citations omitted)).
97. Bigwood v. Def. Intelligence Agency, 770 F. Supp. 2d 315, 321 (D.D.C. 2011)
(finding that a plaintiff did not substantially prevail where the agency “expended a
considerable amount of time” processing the plaintiff’s request prior to his filing suit, the
request was extremely broad, and the agency “experienced a backlog of FOIA requests”).
98. Arpaio v. Citizen Pub. Co., 211 P.3d 8, 10 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008).
99. Democratic Party of Pima Cty. v. Ford, 269 P.3d 721, 725 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2012).
100. ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-19-107(d)(1) (LEXIS through 2018 Second Extraordinary
Sess.).
101. Cf. LA. STAT. ANN. § 44:35D (West, Westlaw through 2018 First Extraordinary
Sess.) (authorizing courts to award “reasonable attorney fees or an appropriate portion
thereof” to any person who “prevails in part”).
102. City of Little Rock v. Carpenter, 288 S.W.3d 647, 652 (Ark. 2008).
103. Id. at 652–53.
104. Id. (finding further that the plaintiff did not even partially prevail).
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Maryland also allows for an award of attorney’s fees to a plaintiff
who “has substantially prevailed.” 105 That state’s highest court has
held that though “an actual judgment in” the plaintiff’s favor is not
required to substantially prevail, there must at minimum be “a causal
nexus between the prosecution of the suit and the agency’s surrender
of the requested information.” 106 This is similar to the federal catalyst
standard. 107 At least one Maryland court has found that the quality of
documents is more important than the quantity. 108 Such an
interpretation could be of interest in North Carolina cases where a
court orders production of a small amount of documents, while a
larger body of records is withheld. 109
A number of New York cases construe its statute as providing a
discretionary award of fees to a plaintiff who “has substantially
prevailed under its Public Officers Law.” 110 For example, where a
defendant produced the sought records even before filing its answer,
the plaintiff still substantially prevailed because it eventually
“received the documents it sought.” 111 Further, where a governmental
defendant was ordered to produce only three of eighteen documents
sought, the State’s appellate division expressed doubt that the
defendant substantially prevailed. 112 A New York plaintiff did not
substantially prevail where the agency’s claimed exemptions were
“largely sustained,” even though the plaintiff eventually obtained
disclosure of certain records. 113
105. MD. CODE ANN., GEN. PROVISIONS § 4-362(f) (West, Westlaw through 2018 Reg.
Sess.).
106. Caffrey v. Dep’t of Liquor Control, 805 A.2d 268, 284 (Md. 2002) (quoting Kline
v. Fuller, 496 A.2d 325, 330 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985)).
107. See supra Part I.B.1.
108. See Kline v. Fuller, 496 A.2d 325, 330 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985).
109. See, e.g., Deitz v. City of Belmont, No. 15-CVS-3203, at 1–2 (N.C. Super. Ct. Aug.
1, 2016) (order denying plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment in part and ordering the
City of Belmont to produce twenty-two pages of a 160-page report as public records).
110. N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 89.4(c) (McKinney 2018).
111. Acme Bus Corp. v. Cty. of Suffolk, 26 N.Y.S.3d 159, 161 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016);
see also N.Y. State Defs. Ass’n v. N.Y. State Police, 927 N.Y.S.2d 423, 425 (N.Y. App. Div.
2011) (holding that defendant’s production of records at the commencement of a lawsuit
and without the need for further proceedings did not preclude a finding that the plaintiff
substantially prevailed). But see William J. Kline & Son, Inc. v. Fallows, 478 N.Y.S.2d 524,
528 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984) (holding that a plaintiff did not substantially prevail where the
requested documents were released prior to the assertion of any defense by the agency).
112. Saxton v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Taxation & Fin., 967 N.Y.S.2d 447, 449 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2013) (“With respect to the request for counsel fees, we find no basis to disturb [the]
Supreme Court’s conclusion that, having secured the disclosure of only three additional
documents out of the 18 sought, petitioners did not substantially prevail.”).
113. Cook v. Nassau Cty. Police Dep’t, 34 N.Y.S.3d 150, 151 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016); see
also Mack v. Howard, 937 N.Y.S.2d 785, 787 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012) (“[I]t cannot be said
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Texas provides for a mandatory award of fees to a plaintiff who
“substantially prevails” in a Public Records action, 114 but its courts
have interpreted the language very differently than their federal
counterparts. Texas courts have cautioned that, where a
governmental defendant voluntarily discloses some documents and a
plaintiff files suit for the rest, the plaintiff must segregate out its nonrecoverable fees concerning the originally disclosed documents. 115
However, failure to do so does not automatically mean a plaintiff
does not substantially prevail. 116
Texas is most notable for providing an example at the other end
of the spectrum from the federal catalyst test. Where a Texas
defendant voluntarily turns over documents and thus moots a Public
Records lawsuit, this does not render the plaintiff a substantially
prevailing party. 117 This is because a Texas plaintiff may only receive
fees where it obtains “judicially sanctioned ‘relief on the merits’” that
“materially alters the legal relationship between the parties.” 118 The
Texas Attorney General cited such cases as examples of how fee
awards are treated in Texas freedom of information cases. 119 As
recently as April 2017, the Court of Appeals of Texas explicitly
declined to adopt the federal catalyst framework. 120 However, this less
plaintiff-friendly standard is paired with a mandatory award of
attorney’s fees. 121
It is worth noting that during the summer of 2017, the Texas
legislature attempted to amend its standard for awarding attorney’s

that petitioner ‘substantially prevailed’ in this proceeding inasmuch as he established his
entitlement to only one of the numerous videotapes requested in the petition.”).
114. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 552.323(a) (West, Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess.).
115. City of Houston v. Kallinen, 516 S.W.3d 617, 629 (Tex. App. 2017); cf. Right to
Know Comm. v. City Council, City & Cty. of Honolulu, 175 P.3d 111, 125–26 (Haw. Ct.
App. 2007) (allowing a plaintiff to recover all of its attorney’s fees even though it only
prevailed on some of its claims because the “unsuccessful claims were sufficiently related
to the successful ones” and the plaintiffs “achieved a level of success that made the hours
reasonably expended a satisfactory basis for making a fee award”).
116. Kallinen, 516 S.W.3d at 629.
117. Tex. State Bd. of Veterinary Med. Exam’rs v. Giggleman, 408 S.W.3d 696, 703–04
(Tex. App. 2013).
118. Id. at 703 (quoting Intercontinental Grp. P’ship v. KB Home Lone Star L.P., 295
S.W.3d 650, 654 (Tex. 2009)).
119. OFFICE OF THE ATT’Y GEN. OF TEX., supra note 82, at 58 n.269.
120. Nehls v. Hartman Newspapers, LP, 522 S.W.3d 23, 31–32 (Tex. App. 2017)
(declining to adopt the federal catalyst framework when urged to do so by a Public
Records plaintiff).
121. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 552.323 (West, Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess.)
(“[T]he court shall assess costs of litigation and reasonable attorney fees incurred by a
plaintiff who substantially prevails.”) (emphasis added)).
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fees to a more plaintiff-friendly approach. 122 It did so by extending to
courts the power to award attorney’s fees “incurred by a plaintiff to
whom a governmental body voluntarily releases the requested
information after filing an answer to the suit.” 123 However, Governor
Abbott vetoed the bill, claiming that it gave “lawyers the ability to
threaten taxpayer-funded attorneys’ fee awards against governmental
bodies that are just trying to follow the law.” 124 North Carolina’s
courts might keep this policy dispute in mind if and when they look to
Texas case law for guidance.
Other states take a more limited view of similar fee-shifting
provisions. A Vermont court found that where records would not
have been obtained without a plaintiff’s lawsuit, that plaintiff
substantially prevailed. 125 A Wisconsin court used a similar theory to
deny “substantially prevailing” status to a plaintiff where
“unavoidable delay,” rather than the plaintiff’s lawsuit, caused the
governmental defendant’s untimely delay in fulfilling a records
request. 126
None of these authorities are binding on North Carolina courts.
However, they could prove useful should a factual situation arise in
North Carolina that has already been litigated in another state.
C.

When the time comes for North Carolina courts to interpret the
plaintiff’s fee provision of the NCPRA, they will be choosing
between at least two competing frameworks.

As noted, there is no North Carolina appellate case law
interpreting the “substantially prevails” language of the plaintiffs’ feeshifting provision in the NCPRA. When the time comes for a court to
do so, there are at least two particularly relevant models from which
North Carolina could borrow. One is the federal standard requiring
that a plaintiff’s suit be a “catalyst for change,” even if it does not
“obtain a judgment in [its] favor.” 127 The other is Texas’s rule that a
122. See H.B. 2783, 85th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2017).
123. Id.
124. Proclamation by the Governor of the State of Texas (June 15, 2017),
http://www.lrl.state.tx.us/scanned/vetoes/85/hb2783.pdf#navpanes=0 [https://perma.cc/C4HREA5U] (announcing his disapproval and veto of House Bill 2783).
125. Burlington Free Press v. Univ. of Vt., 779 A.2d 60, 64 (Vt. 2001).
126. Racine Educ. Ass’n v. Bd. of Educ. for Racine Unified Sch. Dist., 427 N.W.2d 414,
417 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988) (“If the failure to timely respond to a request was caused by an
unavoidable delay accompanied by due diligence in the administrative processes, rather
than being caused by the mandamus action, the plaintiff has not substantially prevailed.”).
127. United States ex rel. Long v. GSDMIdea City, L.L.C., 807 F.3d 125, 128–29 n.2
(5th Cir. 2015); see also supra Part I.B.1.
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plaintiff may only receive fees where it obtains “judicially sanctioned
relief on the merits” that “materially alters the legal relationship
between the parties.” 128 The public records laws of North Carolina
and Texas share nearly identical plaintiffs’ fee-shifting provisions. 129
Both provide for a mandatory award of attorney’s fees to a plaintiff
who substantially prevails, but prohibit such an award if a defendant
acted “in reasonable reliance on” a court order or judgment
applicable to the defendant, the published opinion of an appellate
court, or a written decision or opinion of the states’ respective
attorneys general. 130
Despite the lack of statutory language paralleling the federal
catalyst test, North Carolina courts still could choose to adopt that
test in interpreting the “substantially prevails” language of the
NCPRA. One rationale for doing so could be the North Carolina feeshifting provision’s title and legislative history. 131 The “substantially
prevails” standard was first added as part of a bill entitled “An Act
. . . to strengthen transparency . . . through increasing . . . accessibility
to . . . public records.” 132 The final session law striking the “prevailing
party” standard and substituting in “substantially prevails” language
retained a similar title. 133 This legislative history could be indicative of
the General Assembly’s intent to create a more plaintiff-friendly feeshifting policy. Indeed, a contemporary commentator noted that the
new language “enhanc[ed] the ability of a prevailing plaintiff to
recover its fees.” 134
Under the former “prevailing party” standard, the Court of
Appeals in Spangler rejected the argument that plaintiffs had “the
burden of showing that their lawsuit caused the agency to release the

128. Tex. State Bd. of Veterinary Med. Exam’rs v. Giggleman, 408 S.W.3d 696, 703
(Tex. App. 2013) (citations omitted).
129. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 132-9(c) (2017); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 552.323 (West,
Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess.).
130. § 132-9(c); § 552.323 (Westlaw).
131. See Dickson v. Rucho, 366 N.C. 332, 342, 737 S.E.2d 362, 370 (2013) (“[T]he title
of an act may be an indication of legislative intent.”); see also Petty v. Owen, 140 N.C.
App. 494, 500, 537 S.E.2d 216, 220 (2000) (using the title of an act as evidence of legislative
intent to exempt general contractors from certain licensing requirements).
132. Act of Aug. 2, 2010, ch. 169, sec. 21(c), § 132-9, 2010 N.C. Sess. Laws 638, 660
(codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 132-9 (2017)).
133. Id.
134. Charles E. Coble, N.C. General Assembly Amends Public Records Law, BROOKS
PIERCE: DIGITAL MEDIA & DATA PRIVACY BLOG (July 12, 2010),
http://www.brookspierce.com/news-insights/nc-general-assembly-amends-public-records-law
[https://perma.cc/TS96-42RT].
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documents.” 135 The federal case upon which the defendant principally
relied stated that, while a judgment is not an absolute prerequisite to
an award of attorney’s fees, a plaintiff receiving an award of
attorney’s fees must at least “show . . . that the prosecution of the
action could reasonably have been regarded as necessary and that the
action had substantial causative effect on the delivery of the
information.” 136 The North Carolina Court of Appeals did not
enunciate a clear test for whether a plaintiff prevails.137 It did,
however, affirm the plaintiff’s fee award in the face of the defendant’s
argument that the records would have been produced in a matter of
days without the plaintiff’s lawsuit. 138
While the exact standard used by the Spangler court is not clear,
that court did at least find that a plaintiff who obtained an order
directing release of records was eligible for fees under the former
“prevailing party” standard even where a defendant claimed that the
release was for a reason other than the plaintiffs’ lawsuit. 139 In doing
so, the court rejected the defendant’s argument that a plaintiff’s
lawsuit “must have been necessary to induce . . . disclosure” to qualify
for a fee award. 140 In other words, the Spangler court, at bare
minimum, at least rejected the sort of rigid test requiring “judicially
sanctioned relief on the merits” that “materially alters the legal
relationship between the parties” adopted by Texas courts. 141 Were
North Carolina’s courts to adopt the Texas standard, they would
therefore be interpreting the “substantially prevails” language of an
act intended to increase access to public records to be no more liberal
than the previous “prevailing party” standard in terms of whether a
plaintiff is eligible for attorney’s fees.
One might respond that the change in North Carolina’s fee
award from discretionary to mandatory is enough for the act to
135. N.C. Press Ass’n v. Spangler, 94 N.C. App. 694, 696–97, 381 S.E.2d 187, 189
(1989).
136. Vt. Low Income Advocacy Council v. Usery, 546 F.2d 509, 513 (2d Cir. 1976),
abrogated by Union of Needletrades, Indus. & Textile Employees, AFL-CIO, CLC v. U.S.
Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 336 F.3d 200 (2d Cir. 2003).
137. Spangler, 94 N.C. App. at 698–99, 381 S.E.2d at 190–91.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 697, 381 S.E.2d at 190 (“Here petitioners obtained an Order from the trial
court directing respondents to release the records for inspection, examination and
copying. That respondents were able to obtain a stay of the trial court’s order pending
appeal does not alter the fact that petitioners were the prevailing party in their action.”).
140. Spangler Brief, supra note 44, at 10.
141. Tex. State Bd. of Veterinary Med. Exam’rs v. Giggleman, 408 S.W.3d 696, 703
(Tex. App. 2013) (citing Intercontinental Grp. P’ship v. KB Home Lone Star L.P., 295
S.W.3d 650, 654 (Tex. 2009)).
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increase access to public records. Indeed, the more restrictive
“substantially prevails” definition used by Texas courts is in the
context of a mandatory fee award. 142 Meanwhile, the more plaintifffriendly federal catalyst standard operates in conjunction with a
discretionary award of fees. 143 The argument would go that the
General Assembly might have considered the less plaintiff-friendly
“substantially prevails” standard to in fact increase access to public
records when used in conjunction with a mandatory fee award.
However, this argument assumes that the “substantially prevails”
standard was added at the same time as the mandatory fee award,
which is not the case. The “substantially prevails” language was added
in 2010. 144 Meanwhile, the mandatory fee award was added five years
earlier. 145 Therefore, one could not use the change to a mandatory fee
award as evidence that the 2010 “substantially prevails” standard
could increase access to public records while requiring judicially
sanctioned relief as a condition for a plaintiff’s fee award.
One might further argue that, had the General Assembly
intended to adopt the catalyst standard when it added the
“substantially prevails” language to the NCPRA, it would have
adopted the same language that Congress used to adopt that standard
in 2007. 146 However, the rule that the General Assembly acts with
knowledge of past enactments does not necessarily apply to the
enactments of every other jurisdiction. Further, at least one other
jurisdiction––the District of Columbia––has continued to use the
catalyst test after its federal adoption in 2007, despite the fact that the
District of Columbia has not adopted the federal statutory
language. 147 The District of Columbia’s courts have done so in part
142. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 552.323 (West, Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess.)
(“[T]he court shall assess costs of litigation and reasonable attorney fees incurred by a
plaintiff who substantially prevails.”) (emphasis added)).
143. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E)(i) (2012) (“The court may assess against the United States
reasonable attorney fees and other litigation costs reasonably incurred in any case . . . in
which the [plaintiff] has substantially prevailed.” (emphasis added)).
144. Act of Aug. 2, 2010, ch. 169, sec. 21(c), § 132-9, 2010 N.C. Sess. Laws 638, 660
(codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 132-9(c) (2017)).
145. Act of Aug. 26, 2005, ch. 332, sec. 2, § 132-9, 2005 N.C. Sess. Laws 1190, 1192
(codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 132-9(c) (2017)).
146. OPEN Government Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110–175, sec. 4(a)(2)(II),
§ 552(a)(4)(E), 121 Stat. 2524, 2525 (2007) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012))
(amending the federal Freedom of Information Act to clarify that a plaintiff substantially
prevails where it receives judicial relief or where there is “a voluntary or unilateral change
in position by the agency”); see also United States ex rel. Long v. GSDMIdea City, L.L.C.,
807 F.3d 125, 128–29 n.2 (5th Cir. 2015) (noting that the 2007 amendment to the Freedom
of Information Act instituted the catalyst theory).
147. Frankel v. D.C. Office for Planning & Econ. Dev., 110 A.3d 553, 558 (D.C. 2015).
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because “the catalyst theory accurately reflects the purposes of the
FOIA attorney’s fee provision,” 148 which includes the “expansion of
public access and the minimization of costs and time delays to persons
requesting information.” 149 This reads similarly to the purpose of the
NCPRA, which is to “provide for liberal access to public records.”150
The NCPRA’s purpose is supported by a “strong policy in favor of
disclosure.” 151 The catalyst theory could, therefore, work within the
NCPRA framework without the addition of the federal language.
Depending on which of the two overarching models North
Carolina follows, the world of Public Records law could look very
different for plaintiffs and defendants. Should North Carolina follow
the federal model, this could result in emboldened plaintiffs who
know that they need not obtain formal judicial relief in order to
receive an award of fees. Meanwhile, governmental defendants would
likely feel the pressure of a system that, as they might see it, punishes
them frequently and quickly for mistakes in responding to public
records requests. On the other hand, should North Carolina courts
opt to follow the Texas model requiring formal judicial relief before
fees may be awarded, it is defendants who might be emboldened, and
plaintiffs who may have to more seriously weigh the costs of litigation
before filing suit for access to public records.
D. Under the NCPRA, governmental defendants may receive
attorney’s fee awards in relatively rare circumstances.
The NCPRA also provides for defendants to receive fee awards
in certain situations. A governmental defendant “shall” recover its
reasonable attorney’s fees from “the person or persons instituting the
action” where “the action was filed in bad faith or was frivolous.” 152
“[A] claim . . . is ‘frivolous’ where its ‘proponent can present no
rational argument based upon the evidence or law in support of it.’” 153
It is the mandatory nature of this award that differentiates it from the
148. Id.
149. Id. (quoting D.C. CODE § 2-531 (LEXIS through Aug. 21, 2018)).
150. Jackson v. Charlotte Mecklenburg Hosp. Auth., 238 N.C. App. 351, 353, 768
S.E.2d 23, 25 (2014) (quoting Virmani v. Presbyterian Health Servs. Corp., 350 N.C. 449,
462, 515 S.E.2d 675, 685 (1999)).
151. N.C. Elec. Membership Corp. v. N.C. Dep’t of Econ. & Cmty. Dev., 108 N.C.
App. 711, 716, 425 S.E.2d 440, 443 (1993) (recognizing the strong policy in favor of
disclosure of public records).
152. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 132-9(d) (2017).
153. Philips v. Pitt Cty. Mem’l Hosp., Inc., 242 N.C. App. 456, 458, 775 S.E.2d 882, 884
(2015) (quoting Rhyne v. K-Mart Corp., 149 N.C. App. 672, 689, 562 S.E.2d 82, 94 (2002))
(defining “frivolous” in the context of claims for punitive damages against hospitals).
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generally available fee award for defendants where a plaintiff fails to
raise a justifiable claim. 154
Where a plaintiff files a Public Records lawsuit seeking access to
records that are categorically exempt from disclosure, a court may at
least reserve a defendant’s request for fees for further
consideration. 155 However, the exact language of the NCPRA has not
been interpreted by any North Carolina appellate court. The United
States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina had
the opportunity to comment on the issue in Quality Built Homes, Inc.
v. Village of Pinehurst. 156 While the interpretation of a state law by a
federal court is not binding, North Carolina courts may find the
federal analysis persuasive. 157
In Quality Built Homes, Inc., the plaintiffs made a public records
request in person to the Office of the Clerk of the Village of
Pinehurst on December 22, 2006. 158 The clerk initially refused to
produce the documents, but then produced them “no later than 13
days after the original request.” 159 Over five months later, the
plaintiffs amended an existing complaint to add an allegation that the
defendant Village violated the NCPRA with its “initial refusal to
produce the documents on the day they were requested.” 160
The court noted that the NCPRA “does not provide a claim for
relief after documents have been produced, nor does it provide for a
remedy that would prevent potential future violations.” 161 It therefore
disposed of the plaintiffs’ claims under the NCPRA fairly quickly.
However, that was not the end of the matter. The defendant Village
requested its attorney’s fees, claiming that the plaintiff’s Public
154. Compare § 132-9(d) (stating that the court “shall” assess the attorney fees if the
court determines that the case was brought in bad faith or frivolous), with id. § 6-21.5
(stating that the court “may” award attorney’s fees to the prevailing party in nonjusticiable
cases).
155. See, e.g., Rothman v. Town of Elon, No. 05-CVS-122, 2005 WL 5368433 (N.C.
Super. Ct. Apr. 27, 2005), appeal dismissed, Rothman v. Town of Elon, No. COA05-1151,
2006 WL 851766 (N.C. Ct. App. Apr. 4, 2006).
156. No. 1:06CV1028, 2008 WL 3503149 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 11, 2008). But see Davis v.
Dep’t of State, No. 4:13CV58, 2014 WL 11514765, at *2 (E.D. Va. Aug. 1, 2014) (noting
that a federal court generally “lacks jurisdiction to consider or enforce” North Carolina’s
Public Records law), aff’d, 607 F. App’x 329 (4th Cir. 2015).
157. See, e.g., Huggard v. Wake Cty. Hosp. Sys., Inc., 102 N.C. App. 772, 775, 403
S.E.2d 568, 570 (1991) (“As an interpretation of state law by a federal court this holding is
not binding on us; however we find its analysis persuasive.”), aff’d, 330 N.C. 610, 411
S.E.2d 610 (1992).
158. Quality Built Homes, Inc., 2008 WL 3503149, at *13.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at *14.
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Records Act claim was “filed in bad faith or . . . frivolous.” 162 The
court agreed, finding that the “[p]laintiffs’ claim was, at least,
frivolous and, at most, brought in bad faith.” 163 Not only did the
defendant produce the records “within a reasonable time from the
request,” but “the request was made on December 22, the Friday
before the week of Christmas.” 164 The court further found that the
defendant’s decision to escort the original records requester off of its
premises using police did “not negate the frivolous nature of
Plaintiffs’ claim.” 165 The court ultimately awarded the defendant its
reasonable attorney’s fees “incurred in defending [the plaintiffs’
NCPRA claim].” 166
The Quality Built Homes, Inc. decision is not binding on North
Carolina state courts, as it is a federal district court decision applying
North Carolina law. 167 However, it does present a straightforward
application of the defendant’s fee provision under the NCPRA.
Future litigants would be wise to think twice before filing a Public
Records lawsuit in North Carolina after already receiving the
disputed records, as they would risk being charged the attorney’s fees
of the defendant. Practitioners would further be wise to avoid
bringing claims for relief that are not grounded in the language of the
NCPRA.
Several other jurisdictions require some sort of higher standard
for a defendant to recover its fees in a Public Records lawsuit than
merely prevailing. 168 For example, California allows an award of
162. Id. (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 132-9(d) (2017)).
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. See Self v. Yelton, 201 N.C. App. 653, 661, 688 S.E.2d 34, 39 (2010) (noting that an
unpublished federal district court case “may sometimes be persuasive . . . [though] not
precedential”); Shepard v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, FSB, 172 N.C. App. 475, 479, 617 S.E.2d 61,
64 (2005) (“Although we are not bound by federal case law, we may find their analysis and
holdings persuasive.”), aff’d, 361 N.C. 137, 638 S.E.2d 197 (2006).
168. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 10005(d) (2017) (“The court may award
attorney fees and costs to a successful defendant, but only if the court finds that the action
was frivolous or was brought solely for the purpose of harassment.”); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 119.12(3) (LexisNexis 2017) (“The court shall determine whether the complainant
requested to inspect or copy a public record or participated in the civil action for an
improper purpose. If the court determines there was an improper purpose, the court may
not assess and award the reasonable costs of enforcement, including reasonable attorney
fees, to the complainant, and shall assess and award against the complainant and to the
agency the reasonable costs, including reasonable attorney fees, incurred by the agency in
responding to the civil action. For purposes of this subsection, the term ‘improper
purpose’ means a request to inspect or copy a public record or to participate in the civil
action primarily to cause a violation of this chapter or for a frivolous purpose.”).
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attorney’s fees to a Public Records defendant only where “the
plaintiff’s case is clearly frivolous.” 169 Where a plaintiff brought suit
against a governmental defendant which inadvertently neglected to
attach a few requested documents to an email, a California appellate
court reversed the trial court’s grant of attorney’s fees in favor of the
defendant. 170 This decision signaled a more stringent interpretation of
“frivolous” than the NCPRA. In doing so, the appellate court noted
that an action can lack merit, and it can even be “extremely unlikely”
that the plaintiff will prevail, but this is not enough for a suit to be
“frivolous.” 171 The Ninth Circuit has noted that under the California
Public Records Act, a plaintiff’s claim is “clearly frivolous” only when
it “lacks any merit” or is “prosecuted for an improper motive.” 172
While interpreting a similar statute dealing with fee awards to
governmental defendants in Open Meetings cases, California courts
confirmed that it is very difficult for a government defendant to
recover its fees. 173
Minnesota allows “reasonable costs and attorney fees” to a
governmental defendant when “the court determines” that a Public
Records suit “is frivolous and without merit and a basis in fact.” 174 In
2003, the County of Steele sought its fees under this statute after the
Court of Appeals of Minnesota found that an architectural firm
erroneously named the county as a defendant in its Public Records
lawsuit. 175 The lower court declined to award the defendant county its
fees, and the county appealed, claiming that the plaintiff’s claim was
“obviously frivolous” and had “no basis in fact.” 176 Despite the fact
that the plaintiff obtained no relief from the court and had in fact
sued the wrong party, the appellate court found that the plaintiff’s

169. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 6259(d) (West 2018).
170. Crews v. Willows Unified Sch. Dist., 159 Cal. Rptr. 3d 484, 494, 496 (Cal. Ct. App.
2013).
171. Id. at 494 (quoting Flaherty v. Flaherty, 646 P.2d 179, 187 (Cal. 1982) (en banc)).
172. Maryland ex rel. Doe v. Newport-Mesa Unified Sch. Dist., 840 F.3d 640, 644 (9th
Cir. 2016) (quoting Bertoli v. City of Sabstopol, 182 Cal. Rptr. 3d 308, 320 (Cal. Ct. App.
2015)).
173. See Boyle v. City of Redondo Beach, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 164, 171 (Cal. Ct. App.
1999) (noting that when a defendant seeks attorney’s fees under California’s Open
Meetings law, “a trial court must specify with particularity the basis for the awarding costs
or attorney fees”); see also Frazer v. Dixon Unified Sch. Dist., 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 641, 653
(Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (reversing a trial court’s award of fees to a defendant in an Open
Meetings suit after finding that the defendant prevailed on the majority of the plaintiff’s
claims).
174. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 13.08(4)(a) (West, Westlaw through 2018 Reg. Sess.).
175. WDSI, Inc. v. Cty. of Steele, 672 N.W.2d 617, 621–22 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003).
176. Id. at 622.
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case “had a basis in fact and was not frivolous or without merit.” 177
Therefore, the mere mistakes of the plaintiff were not enough to
merit an award of fees to the defendant under statutory language
similar to that in North Carolina.
Pennsylvania provides for a discretionary award of attorney fees
to a requester of records where “the court finds that the legal
challenge . . . was frivolous.” 178 However, at the appellate level, the
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania held that a losing plaintiff’s
case is not frivolous where the case presents a novel legal issue. 179
That same court has further found that an appeal is not frivolous
simply because a plaintiff erroneously believes that a defendant is
subject to the Public Records law. 180
Ultimately, courts tend to be reluctant to award fees to
defendants in Public Records actions brought under schemes that are
similar to North Carolina’s. This confirms the observation that, under
such provisions, it is “likely that only the most outrageous kind of
harassment [by a plaintiff] would ever be condemned.” 181 Defendants
in North Carolina should therefore rarely, if ever, expect to receive a
fee award at the conclusion of Public Records litigation.
For plaintiffs, fee awards are intended to incentivize litigation182
and increase access to public records. 183 This same policy rationale
177. Id. at 623. It is worth noting that the County of Steele’s contract with a private
party failed to state, as required by law, that all of the data held by the private party in
connection with the contract was subject to the state’s Public Records law. Id. at 621.
While the court acknowledged that the plaintiff’s claim was against the private party and
not the county, the error in the contract between the county and the private party meant
there was a genuine question of law as to whether the county was required to produce the
information. Id. at 621–22.
178. 65 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 67.1304(b) (West, Westlaw through 2018
Reg. Sess. Act 16).
179. Pennsylvanians for Union Reform v. Pa. Office of Admin., 129 A.3d 1246, 1264
n.23 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2015) (“[S]ince none of [the Office of Open Records’] prior
determinations regarding public access to records of PAC contributions made by
Commonwealth employees via payroll deduction have been reviewed by this Court, the
instant legal challenge is not frivolous.”); see also Hearst Television, Inc. v. Norris, 8 A.3d
420, 428 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2010) (“[T]he [government defendant’s] request for costs and
fees . . . is denied because the issue presented in this appeal is a novel issue and involves
the interpretation of two complicated statutes.”), rev’d, 54 A.3d 23 (2012).
180. Scott v. Del. Valley Reg’l Planning Comm’n, 56 A.3d 40, 47 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
2012) (finding that even though the plaintiff erroneously believed that the defendant was
subject to the state Public Records Act, there was no evidence that the plaintiff’s legal
challenge was frivolous).
181. Lowell Thomas Lunsford II, Unintended Consequences, N.C. ST. B.J., Winter
2013, at 6, 7, https://www.ncbar.gov/media/121117/journal-18-4.pdf [https://perma.cc/568TRWEN].
182. See Cmty. Youth Athletic Ctr. v. City of Nat’l City, 164 Cal. Rptr. 3d 644, 694
(Cal. Ct. App. 2013) (“Indeed, the very purpose of the attorney fees provision is to
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underlies fee awards for defendants––not in incentivizing defendants
to litigate, but rather in punishing only those plaintiffs who bring the
most frivolous of suits. The goal of both the plaintiffs’ and
defendants’ fee awards is to embolden plaintiffs to seek access to
records, and in doing so, to keep government open, honest, and
accountable. This approach is in line with the general policy rationale
underlying the NCPRA. 184
II. NORTH CAROLINA OPEN MEETINGS FEE AWARDS:
“PREVAILING PARTIES”
In addition to the fee awards of the NCPRA, both plaintiffs and
defendants can also seek attorney’s fees in litigation under the Open
Meetings law, which generally embodies North Carolina’s public
policy “that the hearings, deliberations, and actions of [public] bodies
be conducted openly.” 185 The law requires that all public bodies “be
open to the public” and “any person [be] entitled to attend” such
meetings. 186 Public bodies may only enter into closed sessions for a
limited number of specifically enumerated purposes. 187 Additionally,
they must further keep a regular schedule of meetings on file and post
notices of any meeting times that deviate from the regular schedule. 188
There are two remedies for violations of the Open Meetings law.
The first is an injunction prohibiting threatened, recurring, or
continuing violations. 189 The second is a declaration that an action was
taken in violation of the Open Meetings law, upon entry of which a

provide ‘protections and incentives for members of the public to seek judicial enforcement
of their right to inspect public records subject to disclosure.’” (quoting Galbiso v. Orosi
Pub. Util. Dist., 167 Cal. Rptr. 3d 788, 807 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008))).
183. See Frankel v. D.C. Office for Planning & Econ. Dev., 110 A.3d 553, 558 (D.C.
2015) (stating that fee awards will incentivize disclosure of documents).
184. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 132-1(b) (2017) (“[I]t is the policy of this State that the people
may obtain copies of their public records and public information free or at minimal cost
unless otherwise specifically provided by law.”); see also N.C. Elec. Membership Corp. v.
N.C. Dep’t of Econ. & Cmty. Dev., 108 N.C. App. 711, 716, 425 S.E.2d 440, 443 (1993)
(noting that the NCPRA provides for a “strong policy in favor of disclosure”).
185. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-318.9 (2017) (“Whereas the public bodies that administer
the legislative, policy-making, quasi-judicial, administrative, and advisory functions of
North Carolina and its political subdivisions exist solely to conduct the people’s business,
it is the public policy of North Carolina that the hearings, deliberations, and actions of
these bodies be conducted openly.”).
186. Id. § 143-318.10(a).
187. See id. § 143-318.11(a) (listing the ten purposes for which a public body may enter
into closed session and describing the procedure for calling such a session).
188. Id. § 143-318.12(b).
189. Id. § 143-318.16.
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court may declare the illegal action null and void. 190 An action
seeking such declaratory relief “must be commenced within 45 days
following the initial disclosure of the action that the suit seeks to have
declared null and void.” 191
A. Comparison of the Open Meetings Law with the NCPRA
The Open Meetings law provides that a court “may award the
prevailing party or parties a reasonable attorney’s fee, to be taxed
against the losing party.” 192 This fee provision is noticeably different
than that of the NCPRA in two immediately apparent ways. First,
both the plaintiffs’ and defendants’ fee provisions in the NCPRA are
mandatory, meaning a court must award fees if it finds that the
conditions of the statute are satisfied. 193 In contrast, the Open
Meetings law provides a court with the discretionary power to award
attorney’s fees when it so chooses. 194 Second, with its Public Records
law, North Carolina makes fees more readily available for a plaintiff
than a defendant. 195 The Open Meetings law, by contrast, provides the
same standard for any party seeking fees. 196
While today’s fee award is discretionary, this was not always the
case. The General Assembly changed the award from mandatory to
discretionary in 1994. 197 Prior to this change, a prevailing party was
“entitled” to a fee award. 198 But while the decision to award
attorney’s fees under the Open Meetings law is itself discretionary,
the determination of which party or parties prevail is not. Rather,
“[t]he designation of a party as a prevailing party . . . is a legal
determination which [an appellate court reviews] de novo.” 199
Therefore, a North Carolina appellate court has the power to
190. Id. § 143-318.16A(a).
191. Id. § 143-318.16A(b).
192. Id. § 143-318.16B.
193. Id. § 132-9(c)–(d).
194. Free Spirit Aviation, Inc. v. Rutherford Airport Auth., 206 N.C. App. 192, 201,
696 S.E.2d 559, 566 (2010).
195. § 132-9(c)–(d) (providing that a plaintiff must receive attorney’s fees if it
substantially prevails, but a defendant only receives fees if the action “was filed in bad
faith or was frivolous”).
196. See id. § 143-318.16B.
197. See Act of June 23, 1994, ch. 570, sec. 3, § 143-318.16B, 1993 N.C. Sess. Laws 181,
186 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143.318.16B (2017)) (changing “shall” to “may” in the
Open Meetings fee award provision, thereby making the award discretionary).
198. Jacksonville Daily News Co. v. Onslow Cty. Bd. of Educ., 113 N.C. App. 127, 131,
439 S.E.2d 607, 609 (1993) (“We note . . . that plaintiff, as prevailing party, is entitled to a
reasonable attorney’s fee.”).
199. Free Spirit Aviation, Inc., 206 N.C. App. at 201, 696 S.E.2d at 566 (quoting Smyth
ex rel. Smyth v. Rivero, 282 F.3d 268, 274 (4th Cir. 2002)).
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determine that a party prevailed as a matter of law and order a trial
court to consider awarding attorney’s fees on remand. 200
In making this legal determination, a court uses the “merits test,”
under which a party may only be considered “prevailing” if it won
“on the merits of at least some of [its] claims.” 201 The North Carolina
courts have taken this “merits test” from the Fourth Circuit’s
treatment of fee awards in federal civil rights cases. 202 The term is not
unique to the Open Meetings law, and should be read consistently as
a term of art–“that is, without distinctions based on the particular
statutory context in which it appears.” 203 The treatment of the term by
North Carolina courts in other contexts is therefore informative. 204
In addition to its discretionary, rather than mandatory, fee
award, the Open Meetings law also jettisons the NCPRA’s distinction
between defendant and plaintiff fee awards. The Open Meetings law
simply provides that a court may award fees to a “prevailing party or
parties.” 205 It does not distinguish between prevailing plaintiffs and
defendants. 206 In a given case, either party has the opportunity to
prevail. 207 However, the Open Meetings law does not expressly
provide for a partial award of fees to a party that partially prevails. 208

200. See Knight v. Higgs, 189 N.C. App. 696, 704, 659 S.E.2d 742, 748 (2008) (“Knight’s
pleadings in Superior Court clearly sought to establish a violation of the Open Meetings
Law. We have determined as a matter of law that such violations occurred. We hold that
Knight is a prevailing party under the statute . . . and the taxing of attorney’s fees should
be considered by the trial court upon remand.”).
201. H.B.S. Contractors, Inc. v. Cumberland Cty. Bd. of Educ., 122 N.C. App. 49, 57,
468 S.E.2d 517, 522 (1996) (citing Smith v. Univ. of N.C., 632 F.2d 316, 350 (4th Cir.
1980)).
202. Id. (citing Smith, 632 F.2d at 350 (applying the merits test in the context of an
attorney’s fees award to a “prevailing party” under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964)).
203. Free Spirit Aviation, Inc., 296 N.C. App. at 203, 696 S.E.2d at 567 (quoting
Grissom v. Mills Corp., 549 F.3d 313, 318 (4th Cir. 2008)).
204. See infra Part II.B.
205. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-318.16B (2017).
206. See id.
207. Free Spirit Aviation, Inc., 206 N.C. App. at 203, 696 S.E.2d at 567 (“[W]e hold that
more than one party—including both a plaintiff and a defendant in the same action—can
be the prevailing party entitled to fees.”); see also Hildebran Heritage & Dev. Ass’n. v.
Town of Hildebran, No. 15 CVS 180, 2015 WL 11182441, at *4 (N.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 11,
2015) (“Applying the merits test for determining whether a prevailing party is entitled to
attorney’s fees under N.C.G.S. § 143-318.16B, the Court finds that the Plaintiffs and the
Defendant Hildebran are both prevailing parties.”).
208. Compare § 143-318.16B, with LA. STAT. ANN. § 42:26 (West, Westlaw through
2018 First Extraordinary Sess.) (“If a person who brings an enforcement proceeding . . .
prevails in part, the court may award him reasonable attorney fees or an appropriate
portion thereof. If the court finds that the proceeding was of a frivolous nature and was
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In the most straightforward cases, a plaintiff who alleges a
violation of the Open Meetings law and then establishes that such
violation occurred has prevailed. 209 However, a plaintiff need not
prevail on every claim in order to be a prevailing party eligible for an
award of attorney’s fees. For example, where a plaintiff sought both
an injunction prohibiting future violations of the Open Meetings law
and a declaration voiding the challenged action, but obtained only the
injunction, the North Carolina Court of Appeals found that the
plaintiff was a “prevailing party.” 210 The court reasoned that
prevailing on the “primary legal question in its cause of action” was a
“significant success” for the plaintiff, making it a “prevailing party.” 211
A plaintiff can therefore prevail even if it does not obtain “everything
set out in its prayer for relief.” 212
There are no North Carolina appellate decisions finding that a
defendant alone was the prevailing party in an Open Meetings
lawsuit. However, despite the legislature’s silence as to whether the
partial fee awards are available, 213 the courts have made clear that
both a defendant and a plaintiff can be prevailing parties. For
example, the court of appeals recently affirmed a trial court’s finding
that both a plaintiff and a defendant prevailed. 214 The trial court
found that the plaintiffs prevailed by succeeding “on a significant
issue . . . by securing an adjudication that the Defendant . . . violated

brought with no substantial justification, it may award reasonable attorney fees to the
prevailing party.”).
209. See Knight v. Higgs, 189 N.C. App. 696, 704, 659 S.E.2d 742, 748 (2008) (“Knight’s
pleadings in Superior Court clearly sought to establish a violation of the Open Meetings
Law. We have determined as a matter of law that such violations occurred. We hold that
Knight is a prevailing party under the statute . . . and the taxing of attorney’s fees should
be considered by the trial court upon remand.”).
210. H.B.S. Contractors, Inc. v. Cumberland Cty. Bd. of Educ., 122 N.C. App. 49, 58,
468 S.E.2d 517, 523 (1996).
211. Id.
212. Free Spirit Aviation, Inc., 206 N.C. App. at 202, 696 S.E.2d at 566 (citing H.B.S.
Contractors, 122 N.C. App. at 58, 468 S.E.2d at 523); see also Har-Mar Collisions, Inc. v.
Scottsdale Ins. Co., 212 So. 3d 892, 906 (Ala. 2016) (noting that a plaintiff must “receive at
least some relief on the merits of his claim before he can be said to prevail” (quoting
Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 760 (1986))).
213. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-318.16B (2017).
214. See Hildebran Heritage & Dev. Ass’n, Inc. v. Town of Hildebran, __ N.C. App.
__, __, 798 S.E.2d 761, 767 (2017) (affirming a trial court’s finding that both parties
succeeded on significant issues in the litigation and were, therefore, both prevailing
parties); Free Spirit Aviation, Inc., 206 N.C. App. at 203–04, 696 S.E.2d at 567 (finding that
the trial court mistakenly believed that it was required to designate either the plaintiffs or
the defendants as the prevailing party).
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the Open Meetings Law in one of the ways contended.” 215 The
defendant likewise prevailed by succeeding “on several significant
issues . . . by securing a directed verdict on all but one of the Plaintiff’s
claims.” 216 Even though the fee award under the Open Meetings law
is for any party that prevails, a court could still consider that fee
awards assessed against plaintiffs could “have a ‘chilling effect’ and
defer citizens from filing . . . suits in the future.” 217
North Carolina trial courts have provided further examples of
prevailing plaintiffs under the Open Meetings law. Where the
Chatham County Board of Elections illegally called an emergency
meeting, failed to convene in open session, failed to go into closed
session pursuant to motion, failed to keep proper minutes, and failed
to provide timely notice of its meetings, the trial court found that the
plaintiff was a prevailing party. 218 At the other end of the spectrum,
where a plaintiff challenged two meetings of the Guilford County
Board of Elections but both were found to comply with the law, the
plaintiff did not prevail. 219 At least one trial court has found that a
plaintiff who is able to show only a “very minor technical violation”
of the Open Meetings law should not receive a fee award. 220
B.

North Carolina courts have provided examples of when a party
prevails in other contexts.

There are only three published North Carolina appellate
opinions providing guidance on when a party prevails in the Open
Meetings context. 221 However, more on how North Carolina courts
adjudicate “prevailing party” status can be learned from treatment of
the term in other contexts.

215. Hildebran Heritage & Dev. Ass’n. v. Town of Hildebran, No. 15 CVS 180, 2015
WL 11182441, at *4 (N.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 11, 2015)
216. Id.
217. Kahana Sunset Owners Ass’n v. Maui Cty. Council, 948 P.2d 122, 126 (Haw. 1997)
(considering a chilling effect on plaintiffs to be a factor weighing against assessing fee
awards against plaintiffs under a scheme where the court was authorized to award fees to
any prevailing party).
218. Lothrop v. Chatham Cty. Bd. of Elections, No. 06-CVS-239, 2006 WL 4526077, at
*5 (N.C. Super. Ct. Sept. 12, 2006).
219. Sigma Constr. Co., v. Guilford Cty. Bd. of Educ., No. 00-CVS-5267, 2000 WL
35514250, at *7 (N.C. Super Ct. Apr. 24, 2000).
220. Womack Newspapers, Inc. v. Dare Cty. Tourism Bd., No. 09-CVS-473, 2009 WL
8634982, at *12 (N.C. Super. Ct. Jan. 1, 2009).
221. See, e.g., Free Spirit Aviation, Inc. v. Rutherford Airport Auth., 206 N.C. App.
192, 201–10, 696 S.E.2d 559, 565–67 (2010); Knight v. Higgs, 189 N.C. App. 696, 704, 659
S.E.2d 742, 748 (2008); H.B.S. Contractors, Inc. v. Cumberland Cty. Bd. of Educ., 122 N.C.
App. 49, 56–58 468 S.E.2d 517, 522–23 (1996).
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For example, where a party appeals or defends against an agency
decision, it may receive an award of attorney’s fees if it prevails. 222 In
North Carolina Alliance for Transportation Reform v. United States
Department of Transportation, 223 a North Carolina federal district
court considered whether an environmental group could recover its
attorney’s fees from North Carolina state agencies. 224 The case was
dismissed pursuant to a joint motion of all parties. 225 Nonetheless, the
court found that the plaintiff had prevailed under both the state
statute and its federal corollary. 226 The court reasoned that the order
of dismissal “embodie[d] a significant portion of the relief Plaintiffs
sought in filing the civil action in the first place,” and the plaintiffs
were therefore prevailing parties. 227
However, simply arriving at a joint dismissal or settlement of a
case is not enough for a party to prevail. Where a plaintiff entered
into a final settlement agreement but did not succeed on “any
significant issue in the litigation,” the North Carolina Court of
Appeals ruled that the plaintiff had not prevailed. 228 The court came
to this conclusion by examining “the benefits sought by the plaintiffs
in the complaint versus those actually obtained by settlement.” 229
The North Carolina Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act
also awards “a reasonable attorney fee to the duly licensed attorney
representing the prevailing party” under certain circumstances. 230 In
that context, where the trial court and court of appeals denied a
plaintiff’s motion for post-judgment interest but the motion was then
granted by the Supreme Court of North Carolina, the plaintiff
prevailed. 231 The court noted that attorney’s fees are allowed “for
services rendered at all stages of litigation, including appeals.” 232 The
Supreme Court of North Carolina has also clarified that a court may
retain jurisdiction of a case even after dismissal for the purpose of
ruling on post-dismissal motions for attorney’s fees. 233

222. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 6-19.1(a) (2017).
223. 151 F. Supp. 2d 661 (M.D.N.C. 2001).
224. Id. at 669.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 671.
227. Id. at 674.
228. House v. Hillhaven, Inc., 105 N.C. App. 191, 196, 412 S.E.2d 893, 896 (1992).
229. Id.
230. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-16.1 (2017).
231. See Custom Molders, Inc. v. Am. Yard Prod., Inc., 342 N.C. 133, 141, 463 S.E.2d
199, 204 (1995).
232. Id. (citing Cotton v. Stanley, 94 N.C. App. 367, 370, 380 S.E.2d 419, 422 (1989)).
233. Bryson v. Sullivan, 330 N.C. 644, 664, 412 S.E.2d 327, 338 (1992).
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Combining these North Carolina cases with direct treatment of
the Open Meetings law by the state’s courts, North Carolina
practitioners have a usable, if not dense, body of state case law from
which they can work.
C.

In the absence of binding case law, North Carolina courts may
lean heavily on the Fourth Circuit’s “prevailing party”
jurisprudence.

In determining whether to award attorney’s fees under the Open
Meetings law, North Carolina courts may look to the Fourth Circuit’s
treatment of fee awards in federal civil rights cases.234 The federal
statutory language provides that a court, “in its discretion, may allow
the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable
attorney’s fee as part of the costs.” 235 While federal case law
interpreting that statute is certainly not binding on North Carolina
courts, the state’s courts use federal decisions as persuasive
guidance. 236
The Fourth Circuit has held that, in order to prevail, a party
“‘need not prevail on all issues if a significant one is resolved’ in its
favor.” 237 Where bringing a suit caused a governmental defendant to
correct unconstitutional procedures during litigation, the plaintiffs
were found to be prevailing parties. 238 A plaintiff can even prevail
where its suit is voluntarily dismissed and other complaints contribute
to a change in policy, so long as the plaintiff’s suit makes a “major
contribution” to the change. 239 By contrast, a plaintiff who failed to

234. H.B.S. Contractors, Inc. v. Cumberland Cty. Bd. of Educ., 122 N.C. App. 49, 57,
468 S.E.2d 517, 522 (1996) (applying the “merits test” in the context of an attorney’s fees
award to a “prevailing party” under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (citing Smith
v. Univ. of N.C., 632 F.2d 316, 350 (4th Cir. 1980))).
235. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2012).
236. See H.B.S. Contractors, Inc., 122 N.C. App. at 57, 468 S.E.2d at 522–23.
237. Lotz Realty Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 717 F.2d 929, 931 (4th Cir.
1983) (quoting Bonnes v. Long, 599 F.2d 1316, 1318 (4th Cir. 1979)), overruled by S-1 & S2 by & through P-1 & P-2 v. State Bd. of Educ. of N.C., 21 F.3d 49, 51 (4th Cir. 1994)
(overruling all cases that apply the “catalyst theory” in finding that a party is prevailing).
238. See Reigh v. Schleigh, 829 F.2d 1334, 1335 (4th Cir. 1987) (“[A]n award may be
made even if plaintiff does not obtain a favorable judgment if it is found that plaintiff’s
actions caused defendant to remedy his errant ways.”).
239. See DeMier v. Gondles, 676 F.2d 92, 93 (4th Cir. 1982) (finding that where the
plaintiffs’ class action suit was only one of several complaints that “contributed to [a]
change in policy” relating to strip searches, the plaintiffs were nonetheless entitled to a fee
award as prevailing parties because their suit made a “major contribution” towards that
change).
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state a claim on which relief could be granted was not allowed to
recover its attorney’s fees. 240
While the Fourth Circuit’s case law may be plaintiff-friendly in
some respects, there is one bright-line limitation. The Fourth Circuit
has rejected a catalyst theory that allows a plaintiff to recover fees as
a prevailing party where its lawsuit does nothing more than “operate
as a catalyst for post-litigation changes in a defendant’s conduct.” 241
The United States Supreme Court also rejected such a catalyst theory
in Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia
Department of Health & Human Resources, 242 finding that a
“defendant’s voluntary change in conduct, although perhaps
accomplishing what the plaintiff sought to achieve by the lawsuit,
lacks the necessary judicial imprimatur on the change.” 243 The
Buckhannon decision thus “resolved . . . the issue of whether the
catalyst theory was an appropriate means of determining if the
plaintiff was a prevailing party.” 244 Should the North Carolina courts
follow the Fourth Circuit’s lead, it would mean a rejection of the
catalyst theory in the Open Meetings context.
D. In light of the Supreme Court’s Buckhannon decision,
jurisdictions outside the Fourth Circuit can also provide guidance
to North Carolina courts on “prevailing party” status.
The D.C. Circuit’s case law since the Supreme Court’s holding in
Buckhannon could be instructive to a court deciding which, if any,
parties prevail under a system that rejects a catalyst theory of
recovery. The D.C. Circuit has laid out three factors that must be
considered when adjudicating prevailing party status: (1) “a courtordered change in the legal relationship of the parties,” (2) a
judgment “in favor of the party seeking fees,” and (3) a “judicial
pronouncement . . . accompanied by judicial relief.” 245 Where a
defendant’s prevailing party status is being adjudicated, only the last
240. See Davis v. Hudgins, 896 F. Supp. 561, 571–72 (E.D. Va. 1995), aff’d, Davis v.
Hudgins, Nos. 95-2532, 96-1126, 1996 WL 327205, at *1 (4th Cir. 1996).
241. S-1 & S-2 by & through P-1 & P-2 v. State Bd. of Educ. of N.C., 21 F.3d 49, 51 (4th
Cir. 1994).
242. 532 U.S. 598 (2001), superseded by statute, Act of Dec. 31, 2007, Pub. L. No. 110175, sec. 4, § 552(a)(4)(E), 121 Stat. 2525, 2525 (2007) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(a)(4)(E) (2012)).
243. Id. at 605.
244. Project Vote/Voting for Am., Inc. v. Dickerson, 444 F. App’x 660, 663 (4th Cir.
2011).
245. Texas v. Holder, 63 F. Supp. 3d 54, 63 (D.D.C. 2014) (quoting Green Aviation
Mgmt. Co. v. FAA, 676 F.3d 200, 203 (D.C. Cir. 2012)).

96 N.C. L. REV. 1725 (2018)

1762

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 96

two factors are relevant. 246 Such a framework, in theory, may be used
by North Carolina courts in deciding whether a party has prevailed in
an Open Meetings lawsuit.
Examples from states with similar Open Meetings fee-shifting
statutes can also prove instructive. The simplest cases are those where
a plaintiff clearly succeeds or fails. For example, many California fee
awards simply turn on whether the governmental defendant violated
the state’s Open Meetings law. 247 However, some cases from other
states can provide insight into how more complicated situations are
resolved. For example, where the Oregon Open Meetings law allows
an award of fees to a “successful” 248 plaintiff, the Court of Appeals of
Oregon held that a plaintiff seeking injunctive relief under that law is
not “held to the exacting showings and standard of proof which apply
to a party that seeks injunctive relief.” 249 Rather, the plaintiff need
only present a prima facie case under the law, and then the burden
shifts to the government body to show that there was no violation. 250
Arizona provides for a discretionary award of fees to a
“successful plaintiff.” 251 Its courts balance the extent to which the
governmental defendant attempted to comply with the Open
Meetings law with the extent to which a successful plaintiff’s action
was beneficial to others. 252 Nebraska similarly allows for a fee award
to a “successful plaintiff.” 253 Its courts have made clear that a party
need not accomplish every objective of its lawsuit in order to qualify
for a fee award. 254 Nebraska courts have further held that “success

246. See id.
247. See Galbiso v. Orosi Pub. Util. Dist., 384 Cal. Rptr. 3d 788, 798 (Cal. Ct. App.
2008) (noting that a violation of the Open Meetings law is a condition precedent to a
plaintiff’s recovery of attorney’s fees); see also San Gabriel Tribune v. Superior Court of
Cal., 192 Cal. Rptr. 415, 426–27 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (noting that a plaintiff could recover
attorney’s fees because the defendant city violated the state’s Open Meetings law).
248. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 192.680(3) (West, Westlaw through 2018 Reg. Sess.).
249. Oregon Ass’n of Classified Emps. v. Salem-Keizer Sch. Dist. 24J, 767 P.2d 1365,
1368 (Or. Ct. App. 1989).
250. Id. at 1368–69.
251. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-431.07(A) (West, Westlaw through 2018 First
Special Sess.), amended by Act of Apr. 17, 2018, ch 229, sec. 3, § 38-431.07, 2018 Ariz. Sess.
Laws __, __.
252. See Carefree Imp. Ass’n v. City of Scottsdale, 649 P.2d 985, 993–94 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1982).
253. NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 84-1414(3) (West, Westlaw through 2018 Second Reg.
Sess.).
254. See, e.g., Wolf v. Grubbs, 759 N.W.2d 499, 526 (Neb. Ct. App. 2009) (“The fact
that the [plaintiffs] did not accomplish the full objective of their lawsuit does not prevent
them from being ‘successful plaintiffs,’ but, rather, goes to the extent of an award for
attorney fees, as the results obtained are an appropriate consideration on that issue.”
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can be measured in small ways.” 255 The Court of Appeals of Maryland
has agreed that a plaintiff need not obtain all of the relief that it seeks
in any Open Meetings case in order to be considered a prevailing
party eligible for attorney’s fees. 256 These examples from other
jurisdictions may prove useful to North Carolina practitioners,
particularly if a factual scenario that has already been litigated under
a similar fee-shifting scheme should arise.
E.

Other jurisdictions can further guide North Carolina trial courts
on how to exercise discretion in awarding attorney’s fees.

Achieving prevailing party status is only half the battle for a
party in a North Carolina Open Meetings case. The ultimate decision
of whether to award attorney’s fees lies within the discretion of the
trial court. 257 It is inherently difficult to define how a court will
exercise this discretion. However, tests formulated by other
jurisdictions for when to award fees to a prevailing party could be
useful for North Carolina trial courts in making this discretionary
determination.
Similar to North Carolina, Montana’s “Right to Know” provision
provides that a court “may” award attorney’s fees to “a plaintiff who
prevails,” and “therefore gives the district court the discretion to
award attorney fees.” 258 However, this discretion is “not
unfettered.” 259 While declining to articulate “firm guidelines” for
when a trial court might deny attorney’s fees, Montana courts
nonetheless have noted that “outright denial of a motion for attorney
fees without rationale, is ‘not an exercise of discretion, but is an abuse
of that discretion.’” 260 A trial court would do better to make its

(quoting Hansmeyer v. Neb. Pub. Power Dist., 578 N.W.2d 476, 485 (Neb. Ct. App.
1998))), aff’d, 588 N.W.2d 589 (Neb. 1999).
255. Hansmeyer v. Neb. Pub. Power Dist., 578 N.W.2d 476, 484 (Neb. Ct. App. 1998)
(quoting Airport Inn, Inc. v. Neb. Equal Opportunity Comm’n, 353 N.W.2d 727, 734 (Neb.
1984)), aff’d, 588 N.W.2d 589 (Neb. 1999).
256. See Armstrong v. Mayor & City Council of Balt., 976 A.2d 349, 374–75 (Md. 2009)
(“The Court of Special Appeals erred in the present case when it concluded that . . . a
party bringing an action alleging an Open Meetings Act violation must obtain the relief it
requests on the merits of its claim in order to be deemed the ‘prevailing’ party.”).
257. See Free Spirit Aviation, Inc. v. Rutherford Airport Auth., 206 N.C. App. 192,
201, 696 S.E.2d 559, 566 (2010) (citing Knight v. Higgs, 189 N.C. App. 696, 704, 659 S.E.2d
742, 748 (2008)).
258. In re Investigative Records of Columbus Police Dep’t, 901 P.2d 565, 567 (Mont.
1995).
259. Yellowstone Cty. v. Billings Gazette, 2006 MT 218, ¶ 31, 143 P.3d 135, 142.
260. Shockley v. Cascade Cty., 367 P.3d 336, 338 (Mont. 2016) (quoting Yellowstone
Cty., 2006 MT 218, at ¶ 30, 143 P.3d at 142).
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conclusions on the record, as this leaves less room for second-guessing
of discretion at the appellate level. 261
Further, South Carolina courts provide six factors to consider
when awarding attorney’s fees, one of which is the nature of the
“beneficial results obtained” by the plaintiff. 262 In theory, a plaintiff
who obtained only partial relief could still receive an award of fees if
a court found that it made a strong showing on the other five
factors. 263 A trial court who addressed these factors in a “conclusory”
fashion was ordered to give them “full and proper consideration” on
remand. 264
Maryland’s courts similarly provide factors for a trial court to use
when deciding whether to exercise its discretion to award attorney’s
fees for an Open Meetings violation. 265 These factors, while providing
some level of predictability, could also be viewed as robbing courts of
the very flexibility that defines the exercise of discretion. 266
Wisconsin courts consider a prevailing plaintiff in an Open
Meetings case to serve as a “private attorney general . . . vindicating
his or her own rights and the rights of the public to open
government.” 267 They therefore award attorney’s fees “if an award
would advance the purpose of the Open Meetings law: to ensure that
the public has the fullest and most complete information possible

261. See Bell v. Katy Indep. Sch. Dist., 994 S.W.2d 862, 867 (Tex. Ct. App. 1999)
(holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it concluded that because
both parties “had legitimate rights to pursue,” each party should pay its own attorneys’
fees).
262. See Burton v. York Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 594 S.E.2d 888, 898 (S.C. Ct. App. 2004)
(citing Jackson v. Speed, 486 S.E.2d 750 (S.C. 1997)).
263. See id. (“There are six factors for . . . determining an award of attorney’s fees: (1)
the nature, extent, and difficulty of the case; (2) the time necessarily devoted to the case;
(3) professional standing of counsel; (4) contingency of compensation; (5) beneficial
results obtained; and (6) customary legal fees for similar services.”).
264. Id.
265. See, e.g., Andy’s Ice Cream, Inc. v. City of Salisbury, 724 A.2d 717, 737 (Md. 1999)
(“Courts considering [Open Meetings Act] fee assessments need to take into account,
among other things, whether, how, and when the issue of a closed session or other
prospective violation was presented to the public body, the basis, if any, the public body
gave for concluding that its action was permissible under the Act, whether that basis was a
reasonable one under the law and the circumstances, whether the amounts claimed are
reasonable, and the extent to which all parties acted in good faith.” (quoting Wesley
Chapel Bluemount Ass’n v. Balt. Cty., 699 A.2d 434, 446 (Md. 1997))).
266. See, e.g., Burton, 594 S.E.2d at 898 (describing the trial court’s determination on
attorney’s fees to be “conclusory” because it did not follow specific factors, despite such
an award being up to the trial court’s discretion).
267. Wisconsin ex rel. Hodge v. Town of Turtle Lake, 508 N.W.2d 603, 609 (Wis. 1993).
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regarding the affairs of government.” 268 The Court of Appeals of
Arizona has similarly found that attorney’s fees should be awarded
where such an award would “[give] effect to the intent that the
legislature has expressed in the Open Meeting law and which is set
forth in the declaration of public policy.” 269 If this condition is met,
then an award of fees should only be denied where “special
circumstances would render an award unjust.” 270 However, it is worth
noting that, unlike North Carolina, both Arizona and Wisconsin
recognize the private attorney general doctrine. 271 Therefore, North
Carolina courts and practitioners should look to states with more
similar fee award schemes before turning to private attorney general
jurisdictions.
California’s appellate courts have taken the step of limiting the
discretion of the trial court to the “fairly narrow” class of situations
where “the defendant shows that special circumstances exist that
would make such an award unjust.” 272 This discretion does not come
from the text of the California fee-shifting provision, which simply
provides, like North Carolina, that a court “may award court costs
and reasonable attorney’s fees to the plaintiff . . . where it is found
that a legislative body of the local agency has violated” the Open
Meetings law. 273 Rather, California’s courts reason that the feeshifting provision was enacted “to encourage private enforcement
268. Id. (citing WIS. STAT. ANN. § 19.81(2) (West, Westlaw through 2018 Act 348))
(declaring the policy of Wisconsin to be that the public is entitled to as full and complete
of information regarding the affairs of government as is compatible with the conduct of
governmental business); cf. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-318.9 (2017) (“[T]he public bodies that
administer the legislative, policy-making, quasi-judicial, administrative, and advisory
functions of North Carolina and its political subdivisions exist solely to conduct the
people’s business,” and therefore, “it is the public policy of North Carolina that the
hearings, deliberations, and actions of these bodies be conducted openly.”).
269. Carefree Imp. Ass’n v. City of Scottsdale, 649 P.2d 985, 994 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982).
270. Hodge, 508 N.W.2d at 609.
271. Compare Arnold v. Ariz. Dep’t of Health Servs., 775 P.2d 521, 537 (Ariz. 1989)
(en banc) (“The private attorney general doctrine is an equitable rule which permits
courts in their discretion to award attorney’s fees to a party who has vindicated a right
that: (1) benefits a large number of people; (2) requires private enforcement; and (3) is of
societal importance.”), and Marquardt v. Milwaukee Cty., 639 N.W.2d 762, 769 (Wis.
2001) (“Generally, the ‘private attorney general’ doctrine permits an individual acting to
enforce the public’s rights to be awarded his or her attorney’s fees from the losing party.”),
with Hoke Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. State, 198 N.C. App. 274, 283, 679 S.E.2d 512, 519 (2009)
(noting that North Carolina does not allow recovery of attorney’s fees under the private
attorney general doctrine).
272. Galbiso v. Orosi Pub. Util. Dist., 84 Cal. Rptr. 3d 788, 799 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008)
(quoting L.A. Times Commc’ns LLC v. L.A. Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 5 Cal. Rptr. 3d 776,
785 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003)).
273. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 54960.5 (West 2018).
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because lack of judicial interpretation hampered the act’s
effectiveness and penalties for noncompliance would otherwise be
inadequate.” 274 A California court will not award fees where it would
be unjust to do so, but the “burden of showing such inequity [rests] on
the defendant.” 275 While North Carolina’s fee-shifting provision does
not share California’s legislative history, it would be understandable
for a North Carolina appellate court to limit the discretion of a trial
court in denying attorney’s fees on the basis that doing so will serve
the underlying policy of the Open Meetings law “that the hearings,
deliberations, and actions of [public] bodies be conducted openly.” 276
If there is a lesson for North Carolina courts to glean from these
jurisdictions, it is that they will do best to make their discretionary
findings in writing on the record with reasoning included. This avoids
the criticism that a court acted in a conclusory fashion or abused its
discretion by outright denying attorney’s fees without giving the issue
proper consideration.
F.

Plaintiffs in North Carolina Open Meetings litigation should
engage in a risk-reward analysis on fee awards before filing suit.

In the Open Meetings context, a defendant has no control over
what issues are litigated. This is because the only proper defendant in
an Open Meetings lawsuit is a “public body.” 277 Using the merits test
and looking to persuasive law from other jurisdictions, North
Carolina courts will ask whether a plaintiff or defendant succeeded on
significant issues in litigation when determining whether they
prevailed and are therefore eligible for an award of attorney’s fees. 278
Therefore, which party prevails will be determined by the resolution
of the issues that the plaintiffs choose to present to the court.
If a plaintiff has a number of potential Open Meetings claims
against a public body, it should consider how likely it is to succeed on
each individual claim before filing suit. A party who brought forward
only its strongest claims will be more likely to be considered
prevailing by a court, given that a small amount of stronger claims will
give the plaintiff a greater chance of achieving a “significant success”
274. L.A. Times Commc’ns, 5 Cal. Rptr. at 784 (quoting Common Cause v. Stirling, 174
Cal. Rptr. 200, 202–03 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981)).
275. Int’l Longshoremen’s & Warehousemen’s Union v. L.A. Exp. Terminal, Inc., 81
Cal. Rptr. 2d 456, 465 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999) (quoting Common Cause v. Stirling, 174 Cal.
Rptr. 200, 204 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981)).
276. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-318.9 (2017).
277. Id. § 143-318.10(b).
278. See H.B.S. Contractors, Inc. v. Cumberland Cty. Bd. of Educ., 122 N.C. App. 49,
58, 468 S.E.2d 517, 523 (1996).
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on the “primary legal question in its cause of action.” 279 This will
further put the plaintiff in a better position to receive attorney’s fees
were the court to examine “the benefits sought by the plaintiffs in the
complaint versus those actually obtained by settlement.” 280
CONCLUSION
North Carolina’s fee-shifting provisions have been the subject of
limited judicial interpretation. However, there is still room to make
observations and predictions about how courts have, and may, treat
these provisions.
Between the Public Records and Open Meetings laws, the Open
Meetings provision is the more predictable of the two. This is because
North Carolina courts have demonstrated a willingness to borrow the
principles of “prevailing party” jurisprudence from more wellestablished bodies of persuasive law, like that of the Fourth Circuit,
rather than craft tests that are specific to North Carolina. While it is
theoretically possible that this trend could change in the future, there
is no reason right now to think that it will. Litigants and courts in
Open Meetings fee disputes will likely, therefore, continue to apply
broadly accepted principles in the specific context of their dispute
with little room to make novel legal arguments.
However, the Public Records provision is a different story. On
the plaintiffs’ side, the “substantially prevails” language of section
132-9(c) is ripe for judicial interpretation. Even taking into account
the persuasive landscape, it is far from certain how North Carolina’s
appellate courts will treat this language when the time comes. The
two most likely possibilities are that these courts will either (1) adopt
the “catalyst” framework used in the federal FOIA context or (2) opt
for a more defendant-friendly standard like that of Texas. The Texas
option is bolstered by the fact that the North Carolina and Texas
statutes are almost identical. However, North Carolina courts are by
no means bound to follow the Texas courts’ interpretation of identical
language. Indeed, the policy disputes that have arisen in Texas
surrounding this defendant-friendly standard could cause North
Carolina courts to think twice before following suit.
As far as the defendants’ fee provision of the NCPRA is
concerned, the law does have the benefit of treatment from at least

279. Id.
280. House v. Hillhaven, Inc., 105 N.C. App. 191, 196, 412 S.E.2d 893, 896 (1992).

96 N.C. L. REV. 1725 (2018)

1768

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 96

one court––albeit a federal district court with no binding authority. 281
That decision should at least serve as a warning to plaintiffs who
either (1) have already received the disputed records and are
considering filing a Public Records lawsuit as a punitive measure or
(2) are seeking to quickly file suit against a defendant that has not
acted as swiftly as the plaintiff might like. This is not to say that a
plaintiff could not successfully enforce the NCPRA’s mandate that a
defendant produce records “as promptly as possible.” 282 Rather, this
simply means that a plaintiff who jumps to file a Public Records
lawsuit only a matter of days after making their requests risks being
found to have filed suit in bad faith or on a frivolous basis.
Ultimately, the best way for these provisions to be more
precisely defined is through further treatment by appellate courts.
This can only occur as more litigation reaches the appellate level, as a
North Carolina court will not issue a “purely advisory opinion which
the parties might, so to speak, put on ice to be used if and when
occasion might arise.” 283 Unless and until such further litigation
occurs, courts and practitioners will have to look to other jurisdictions
for guidance on how they should treat these provisions.

281. See Quality Built Homes, Inc. v. Vill. of Pinehurst, No. 1:06-CV-1028, 2008 WL
3503149, at *11 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 11, 2008).
282. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 132-6(a) (2017); see also Elliot Engstrom, “Tuning-Up” North
Carolina’s Public Records Act: A Brief Discussion of Problem Areas and Possible
Solutions, 9 ELON L. REV. 23, 44 (2017) (discussing the meaning of the “as promptly as
possible” language in the NCPRA).
283. Chapel H.O.M. Assocs., LLC v. RME Mgmt., LLC, __ N.C. App. __, __, 808
S.E.2d 576, 580 (2017) (citing Town of Tryon v. Duke Power Co., 222 N.C. 200, 204, 22
S.E.2d 450, 453 (1942)).

